Essays in development and environmental economics by Hanna, Rema
Essays in Development and Environmental Economics
by
Rema Hanna
B.S., Cornell (1999)
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2005
© Rema Hanna. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to Massachusetts Institute of Technology permission to
reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author..i ........ ... ...-.................................................
Department of Economics
A d I 4 / 15 August 2005
Certified by - .-. ... .................................................
Michael Greenstone
3M Associate Professor of Economics
,, , i ? Thesis Supervisor
Certified by.... ........ .................... ...........................
Esther Duflo
Professor of Economics
/Q ,. ~ . Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by...........................................................................
Peter Temin
Elisha Gray II Professor of Economics
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
-'^CHIVES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
SEP 3 0 2005
LIBRARIES
I
Essays in Development and Environmental Economics
by
Rema Hanna
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on 15 August 2005, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays on economic development and envronmental
economics.
Chapter 1 measures the response of U.S. based multinational firms to the Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA), which dramatically strengthened U.S. environmental regulation. Using
a panel of firm-level data over the period 1966-1999, I estimate the effect of regulation on a
multinational's foreign production decisions. The CAAA induced substantial variation in the
degree of regulation faced by firms, allowing for the estimation of econometric models that
control for firm-specific characteristics and industrial trends. I find that the CAAA caused
regulated multinational firms to increase their foreign assets by 5.3% and their foreign output
by 9%. In aggregate, this increase represents approximately 0.6% of the stock of multinationals'
domestic assets in polluting industries. Contrary to common beliefs, I find that heavily regulated
firms did not disproportionately increase foreign investment in developing countries. Finally,
this paper presents limited evidence that U.S. based multinationals increased imports of highly
polluting goods when faced with tougher U.S. environmental regulation. Overall, these results
are consistent with the view that U.S. environmental regulations cause U.S. firms to move
capital and jobs abroad.
Chapter 2 looks at the teacher absence. In the rural areas of developing countries, teacher
absence is a widespread problem. This paper tests a simple incentive program based on teacher
presence can reduce teacher absence, and whether this has the potential to lead to more teaching
activities and better learning. In 60 one-teacher informal schools in rural India, randomly chosen
out of 120, a financial incentive program was initiated to reduce absenteeism. Teachers were
given a camera that had a temper-proof date and time function, along with instructions to
have one of the children photograph the teacher and other students at the beginning and end
of the school day. The time and date stamps on the photographs were used to track teacher
attendance. A teacher's salary was a direct function of his attendance. The introduction of the
program resulted in an immediate decline in teacher absence. The absence rate changed from an
average of 42% in the comparison schools to 22% in the treatment schools. When the schools
were open, teachers were as likely to be teaching in both types of schools, and the number
of students present was roughly the same. The program positively affected child achievement
levels: A year after the start of the program, test scores in program schools were 0.17 standard
deviations higher than in the comparison schools and children were more likely to be admitted
into regular schools.
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Chapter 3 estimates the labor supply effect of childbirth for Jewish and Muslim women
in Israel. As a source of exogenous variation in childbirth I use preferences over the gender
composition of children, which vary across the two cultural groups. While Israeli Arabs prefer
sons, Israeli Jews have a relative taste for symmetric families (at least one son and one daughter).
Highly educated Arabs and Jews appear to prefer small families, but are significantly more likely
to have another child if they only have daughters. Using this exogenous variation in fertility,
I find that Jewish women work less as a result of having a third child. Arabs work less as
result of having a third child; however, this decrease is not significant at conventional levels.
When extending the analysis to look at the labor supply response to a fourth child, I find that
Jewish women are less likely to work with an additional child, whereas Muslim women are
more likely to be employed. However, religious institutions may not be fully responsible for
these differences in behavior. Instead, other socioeconomic characteristics may attribute to the
observed differences in the labor supply response across religious groups.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Greenstone
Title: 3M Associate Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Esther Duflo
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
U.S. Environmental Regulation and
FDI: Evidence from a Panel of U.S.
Based Multinational Firms
Summary 1 This paper measures the response of U.S. based multinational firms to the Clean
Air Act Amendments (CAAA), which dramatically strengthened U.S. environmental regulation.
Using a panel of firm-level data over the period 1966-1999, I estimate the effect of regulation
on a multinational's foreign production decisions. The CAAA induced substantial variation
in the degree of regulation faced by firms, allowing for the estimation of econometric models
that control for firm-specific characteristics and industrial trends. I find that the CAAA caused
regulated multinational firms to increase their foreign assets by 5.3%o and their foreign output
by 9%. In aggregate, this increase represents approximately 0.6% of the stock of multinationals'
domestic assets in polluting industries. Contrary to common beliefs, I find that heavily regulated
firms did not disproportionately increase foreign investment in developing countries. Finally,
this paper presents limited evidence that U.S. based multinationals increased imports of highly
polluting goods when faced with tougher U.S. environmental regulation. Overall, these results are
consistent with the view that U.S. environmental regulations cause U.S. firms to move capital
and jobs abroad.
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1.1 Introduction
Do tougher environmental regulations cause firms to flee the country? Although several stud-
ies document the impact of environmental regulation on domestic production,1 the question
of whether firms increase foreign manufacturing in response to new domestic regulation has
remained unanswered. Consequently, our understanding of the efficacy of environmental pol-
icy is limited, as is our understanding of the distributional impacts of "local" environmental
policies. In an attempt to offer evidence on this question, this paper uses firm-level data and
a differences-in-differences strategy to test whether firms increase manufacturing abroad in re-
sponse to tougher environmental regulations at home, with a particular focus on whether firms
shift manufacturing to developing countries, which typically have weaker environmental laws.
U.S. environmental regulations are often met with the claim that, by making domestic pro-
duction more costly, they force firms to shift manufacturing abroad. Firms can shift production
through two possible mechanisms. First, a firm may contract production to foreign manufac-
turing firms (outsourcing). Second, a firm may invest in foreign manufacturing facilities, and
directly produce goods overseas (foreign direct investment, or FDI). While understanding both
mechanisms is necessary to evaluate the effects of local environmental regulation, the lack of
data and the inherent difficulty of measuring a firm's exposure to regulation have previously
hindered rigorous statistical analysis of either mechanism.
This paper compiles detailed firm-level regulation data to investigate the link between reg-
ulation and a firm's foreign production decisions. Specifically, I test whether the Clean Air
Act Amendments (CAAA)-legislation that dramatically strengthened environmental regula-
tion in the United States-resulted in increased foreign direct investment (FDI) by U.S. based
multinational firms. In addition, I evaluate claims that the regulations spurred firms to dis-
proportionately increase manufacturing in developing countries, which would have important
distributional effects.
I find evidence that the CAAA legislation increased the outbound FDI of U.S. based multi-
national firms in dirty industries. In particular, the analysis in this paper suggests that the
CAAA regulations caused multinationals to increase their foreign assets in polluting industries
1 See Gray and Shadbegian, 1995; Jaffe, et al., 1995; Levinson, 1996; Becker and Henderson, 2001; Greenstone,
2002
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by 5.3% and their foreign output by 9%. Contrary to popular beliefs, heavily regulated firms
did not disproportionately increase production in developing nations relative to other countries.
Finally, there is limited evidence that heavily regulated U.S. multinationals increased imports
from their foreign affiliates in response to regulation, and there is robust evidence that firms
reacted more strongly to regulation if they manufactured within an industry for which imports
have historically accounted for a large percentage of U.S. consumption. Taken together, these
results are consistent with the theory that regulation causes a firm to substitute foreign for
domestic production.
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between environmental regu-
lation and FDI. Previous studies have mostly focused on the impact of a receiving country's
(or state's) environmental stringency on inward FDI (Xing and Kolstad, 1998; Smarzynska and
Wei, 2001; Mani, Huq, and Pargal, 1996; Levinson and Keller, 2002; Raspiller and Riedinger,
2004; Dean, Lovely, and Wang, 2004). Eskeland and Harrison (1997) is a notable departure
from the literature: their paper tests whether the pattern of outbound U.S. investment during
the 1980s and early 1990s can be explained by variations in pollution abatement costs across
different sectors of the U.S. economy. Both approaches have yielded mixed conclusions, and,
for the most part, have failed to uncover robust evidence of industrial relocation in response to
environmental regulation 2
However, this lack of evidence may be attributed to two factors. First, it is difficult to
measure environmental stringency across regions: in general, only broad measures of environ-
mental stringency across host countries or states (participation in treaties, abatement costs)
are available, and these are often correlated with other factors important in attracting FDI.
Second, most environmental regulations apply to all manufacturing firms in a country or all
firms in a particular industry, and therefore, it is quite difficult to find a control group against
which to evaluate the effects of new regulations. Previous studies have typically tested whether
the effect of environmental stringency differs across industries of varying pollution intensity,
under the hypothesis that the regulation effect on FDI is concentrated in polluting industries.
However, there have been concerns in the literature (Jaffe, 1995; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001)
2
'In fact, Mani, Huq, and Pargal (1996) and Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2004) find that foreign investors tend
to invest in areas with high environmental stringency.
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that this strategy may potentially confound industry specific trends in FDI (such as oil shocks,
recessions) with regulation.
This paper aims to overcome these limitations and establishes whether a causal relationship
exists between environmental regulation and FDI. Following Eskeland and Harrison (1997), I
analyze whether tougher environmental regulation at home increases outbound FDI. Rather
than using industry-level measures of environmental stringency, this study exploits the plau-
sibly exogenous variation in firm-level regulation created by the Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA). Following their passage in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency established sep-
arate national ambient air quality standards-a minimum level of quality that all U.S. counties
are required to meet-for four criteria pollutants. Each year, counties whose air concentra-
tions exceed federal standards for a specific pollutant receive a nonattainment designation
for that pollutant, while counties that are in attainment of federal standards receive an attain-
ment designation. Manufacturing plants that emit a criteria pollutant in a county designated
nonattainment are subject to relatively tougher regulatory oversight than emitting plants in
attainment counties.
The nature of the CAAA regulatory program allows for a modified differences-in-differences
approach to test whether firms were more likely to expand their overseas manufacturing oper-
ations when the U.S. counties in which they operate fell into nonattainment and were, thereby,
subject to tougher environmental oversight. In contrast to the previous literature, this ap-
proach allows for the estimation of regulation effects that are purged of bias associated with
industry specific trends. This is particularly important because, during this period, there were
many factors (e.g. oil shocks, country liberalizations, technology changes) that may have had
differential impacts on industry-level FDI. In addition, because the CAAA induced substantial
variation in the level of regulation faced by an individual firm across time, I can compute the
effect of regulation that is independent of firm specific characteristics (e.g. production process,
firm size) that may also potentially affect FDI. As a result, this paper overcomes objections in
the literature (for example, Zarsky, 1999) that earlier studies on the impact of environmental
regulation ignored firm specific effects.
To implement this strategy, I take advantage of a confidential, firm-level dataset collected
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), of the U.S. Department of Commerce, on the
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activities of U.S. based multinational firms. The data provide detailed information on the fi-
nancial and operating characteristics of U.S. firms manufacturing abroad between the years
1966 to 1999. I augment this dataset with annual data on the four pollutant-specific, attain-
ment/nonattainment designations for each U.S. County and with detailed data on the U.S.
operations of each multinational firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the Clean Air Act Amendments and the
conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data. Section 4 presents
the estimation results, while Section 5 provides a discussion of the results. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 The Environment and Foreign Direct Investment
1.2.1 The Clean Air Act Amendments
This study uses the variation in firm level regulation induced by the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments (CAAA) to determine whether firms expand their foreign manufacturing operations in
response to domestic environmental regulation. Initially passed in 1970, the CAAA stipulated
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classify U.S. counties into pollutant-specific
nonattainment and attainment categories, based on the ambient concentrations of four relevant
pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), tropospheric ozone (03), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and total
suspended particulates (TSP).3 Each July, the classifications are reevaluated, and every U.S.
County is officially reclassified as being either in or out of attainment of the national standards
for each of the criteria pollutants.
Relative to attainment counties, strict regulatory oversight is exerted on polluting manu-
facturers in nonattainment counties. When a county falls into nonattainment, the law requires
its state to develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which lays out specific regulations for
every major source of each pollutant for which the county is in nonattainment. The plans im-
pose substantial regulations on both new and existing manufacturing facilities. In general, the
SIPs stipulate that new investments or plant renovations must be paired with the installation
of state-of-the art pollution abatement equipment. Existing plants are subject to "reasonably
:31 classify a county as nonattainment for ozone if it is in nonattainment for Nitrogen Oxide or Volatile Organic
Compounds.
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available control technologies," which usually involves retrofitting existing equipment. States
may also dictate changes in an industry's production process, such as forcing existing print-
ers in nonattainment counties to substitute highly polluting inks with more expensive, cleaner
versions. Furthermore, the regulations make it more costly for an existing plant to modify
its operations, as they require that the entire plant comply with current standards for new
sources. In contrast, large-scale investments in attainment counties require relatively cheaper
abatement equipment, and existing plants are essentially unregulated.4 Non-polluters are free
from regulation in both categories of counties.
In nonattainment counties, the regulations are vigorously enforced by both federal and state
agencies, and violating manufacturers may face extensive "civil penalty plus recovery of any
economic benefit of non-compliance" and orders requiring the "correction of the violation." 5
Although individual states have some leeway to create and implement the SIP, the EPA en-
joys substantial oversight of each state's enforcement activities. In particular, the EPA may
withhold federal highway funding, impose a federal moratorium on new plant construction, and
seize control over the state's environmental policy if it deems that a state is delinquent in its
responsibilities.
Enforcement efforts appear to have had "bite." The CAAA substantially affected U.S. in-
dustrial activity. Cohen (1998) documents the effectiveness of the regulations at the plant level.
A series of papers (for example, Kahn, 1997; Greenstone, 2002) show that the regulations re-
tarded the growth of polluting manufacturers in nonattainment counties. Moreover, Becker
and Henderson (2000) provide evidence that, controlling for socioeconomic conditions across
counties, firms were more likely to choose an attainment county for a new plant. 6
Further evidence of the bite of the regulation can be found in firm reactions: in 1997,
the business community attempted (unsuccessfully) to lobby against the EPA's plans to alter
ozone standards, which would have effectively doubled the number of counties in nonattainment
4New and modified sources in attainment counties that emit large quantities of the criteria pollutant are
subject to the "best available control technologies." However, this is negotiable for individual cases and, unlike
the nonattainment counties, this is sensitive to economic burdens.
5EPA Compliance Website
6 Several papers found results contrary to Becker and Henderson (2000). For example, Schwab and McConnell
(1990) concluded that a county's nonattainment designation did not deter new plants in the motor vehicle
industry. Their estimation strategy, though, did not account for the fact that counties are often in nonattainment
because polluting plants have historically viewed them as productive, cost-effective places to locate.
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for ozone.7 Lastly, perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence that the regulations are
successfully enforced is the fact that air pollution concentrations declined at a relatively faster
rate in nonattainment counties subsequent to the regulations (Henderson, 1996; Chay and
Greenstone, 2003).
1.2.2 Sources of Policy Variation
The particular structure of the CAAA regulatory program enables a compelling identification
strategy with which to determine the effect of tougher environmental regulation on a firm's
foreign production decisions.
Most importantly, the regulations only apply to manufacturing facilities operating within
nonattainmnent counties, inducing variation in the level of regulation across firms. This allows
me to compare the effect of regulation across firms within the same industry, and thus remove
shocks (oil shocks, new technologies, recessions) common to a particular industry that may
potentially be correlated with regulation.
Second, the policy was designed to ensure that all counties that achieve nonattainment
status are similarly regulated. The CAAA emission standards are federally mandated and, thus,
consistently applied throughout the country. Although individual states formulate separate
enforcement policies, the EPA has sufficient mechanisms to ensure that each state similarly
regulates polluting manufacturers. As a result, this eliminates the possibility that differences
in tastes or other characteristics across counties are potentially correlated with firm production
choices, thus biasing the estimated regulation effects.
Another possible concern is that nonattainment and attainment counties may have different
underlying socioeconomic conditions (such as population density, unionization rates), which
may cause a spurious correlation between the probability that a county earns a nonattainment
designation (high pollution) and the FDI of firms operating within these counties. However,
because non-emitting plants are not subject to CAAA regulation in either type of county, I
can isolate changes in the FDI outcomes of non-emitting firms across U.S. counties to remove
the effect of' manufacturing in a nonattainment county that is independent of regulation. In
addition, because a county's designation varies over time, I can control for differences between
7"Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Broaden their look at the Clean Air Act." New York Times, 2001.
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counties over time, ensuring that time varying factors common to nonattainment counties (wage
growth, population growth) are not confounded with the effects of regulation.
Finally, the designation of nonattainment status is reevaluated annually. A firm that is
subject to varying levels of regulation at different points in time can be followed, thereby
allowing the paper to include estimates that are derived from within a firm. This methodology
ensures that firm specific factors (firm size, production technologies) do not drive the results.
1.2.3 Conceptual Framework
The results presented in this paper provide a good measure of the effect of the CAAA regulatory
program on U.S. outbound FDI, as the program is currently written. However, the results may
underestimate the overall effect of environmental regulation, and this should be taken into
account when generalizing them to other settings.
The identification strategy relies on the comparison of firms across U.S. counties with varying
regulation levels. Regulation increases the expected costs of production, and if these costs
become prohibitively high, a firm might relocate. In this case, a firm has two options: move
to another (less regulated) U.S. county or move abroad. Quite simply, if the expected profits
of foreign production exceed the profits of producing within another U.S. county, the firm will
move abroad; otherwise the firm will relocate within the United States.
The estimated regulation effect, therefore, measures the actual change in FDI that results
from the CAAA regulation. However, some firms residing in high regulation counties will
shift production to low regulation counties rather than moving abroad (and some firms in low
regulation counties will shift production abroad in response to regulation). Therefore, this
strategy provides a lower bound of the effect of regulation had it been equally implemented
across the United States. The extent to which this lower bound underestimates the overall
effect depends on the magnitude of firms that switched to another U.S. county.
There are numerous reasons why the expected costs of foreign production may be greater
than the costs of producing in another county, and each reason has different implications for the
interpretation of the estimated regulation effect. For example, consider a world with adjustment
costs, where firms cannot instantaneously react to regulation. A firm may be unwilling to pay
the costs of relocating to another U.S. county that, though unregulated today, has a nonzero
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probability of future regulation. In this case, the bias of the regulation effect would be smaller
than the case where it is costless for a firm to shift between U.S. counties.
Finally, consider the most extreme scenario: it is possible that the expected costs of U.S.
regulation are sufficiently high that all U.S. firms would prefer shifting production abroad.
However, in the short run, only firms for whom the expected compliance costs exceed the
adjustment costs will relocate. Firms would never shift production to another U.S. county.
Thus, the empirical strategy would provide an unbiased estimate of the short-run effect of
environmental regulation (in the long run, regulation would force all firms abroad).
In summary, this paper measures the actual outsourcing effects of U.S. environmental policy
during the last 40 years. Furthermore, the estimated results can be viewed as a lower bound on
the overall effect of environmental regulation on firm behavior, helping us to better understand
the welfare consequences of country-level environmental policies.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I first describe the regression framework. Next, I discuss the construction of the
CAAA regulation variable. I conclude with a detailed description of the data.
1.3.1 Regression Framework
This paper employs a modified differences-in-differences approach to determine the effect of
CAAA regulation on the foreign manufacturing operations of U.S. based multinationals. In
particular, I test whether firms were more likely to increase foreign production within an in-
dustry if a large share of their U.S. manufacturing facilities (in that industry) were regulated.
Multinational firms regularly operate in multiple industries, making it difficult to classify a
firm as belonging only to a "dirty" or "clean" industry. To address this issue, I disaggregate
both the regulation data and foreign investment data to the level of a firm (indexed by f) by
industry segment (indexed by i). The panel structure of the data allows me to follow these
segments across years (indexed by t). In a given year, an individual firm may have up to 45
industrial segments. The baseline empirical specification is as follows:
Yfit = /0 + 31Indfi(t-k) + /32Nonfi(t-k) + /33Regfi(t-k) + Cfi + 6ft + S7 it + Efit (1.1)
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where (t-k) indexes the most recent year for which FDI data was available. Yfit is a measure of
a firm's direct foreign production within an industrial segment (including capital stock, output,
and sales). Efit is the stochastic error term.
Regfi(t-k) is a lagged measure of a firm-industry's exposure to CAAA regulation, for any
pollutant. Specifically, it is the lagged percentage of a firm's U.S. plants that were effectively
regulated under the CAAA within an industrial segment, where an individual manufacturing
plant is considered "regulated" if the U.S. plant is in a dirty industry and located in a nonat-
tainment county. The construction of Regfi(t_k) is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
Indfi(tk) is a vector of "industries at home" dummy variables that indicate whether a firm
manufactured within a domestic industry in a given year, and whose effects are time varying to
capture shocks common to firms manufacturing in a particular U.S. industry. These variables
remove the main effect of manufacturing in a domestic industry.
Nonfi(tk) is a vector of variables that give the proportion of a firm's U.S. manufactur-
ing facilities, in an industrial segment, that are located in a nonattainment county, by year.8
Nonfi(t_k) parametrically controls for the main effect of manufacturing in a nonattainment
county. This is especially important because operating within a nonattainment county may
affect FDI independently of regulation if counties in nonattainment systematically differ than
those in attainment (for example, counties that are in nonattainment differ from those in attain-
ment in observable characteristics such as rates of unionization and average education level).9
The panel structure of the data allows for additional controls that purge the regulation effect
of bias associated with industry and firm specific trends, which may be potentially correlated
with regulation. Specifically, I include firm by industry (i), industry by year (it) and firm by
time (6 ft) fixed effects. The inclusion of industry by year fixed effects (it) removes shocks to
FDI that are common to all firms investing abroad within an industry in a particular year. In-
8Nonfi(t-k) is defined as 1 * ( D ) ((Nonattain,,(t-k)z) > * 100Nf, (t -k) P-)
9It is important to note that Nonfi(t_k) constrains the main effect of manufacturing in a nonattainment
county to be identical across counties. I would ideally relax this restriction and include a vector of time varying,
county fixed effects. However, given the number of observations, I cannot control for the ensuing 18,000 county-
year fixed effects. Nonetheless, since the emission standards (and policy implementation) are the same for each
nonattainment county, the main threat to the estimation strategy comes from differences in trends between firms
manufacturing in nonattainment and attainment counties, not between particular counties. Consequently, this
restriction should not significantly alter the results.
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cluding industries by year fixed effects is especially important if certain industries increased FDI
during this period for reasons unrelated to environmental regulation (e.g. the U.S. automobile
industry significantly shifted production to Mexico after NAFTA).
Firm by year fixed effects (ft) remove the mean FDI across all of a firm's industrial segments
in a particular year. This controls for unobserved factors that equally affect FDI across a
firm's polluting and nonpolluting segments (e.g. a change in a firm's credit ratings or senior
management).
Finally, firm by industry fixed effects (fi) absorb the unobserved heterogeneity in the
determinants to FDI that are common to a particular industry within a given firm. In effect,
this allows a firm-industry that is unregulated in one period to act as a comparison group
for itself when regulated in other periods. These controls are important if we believe that
a firm-industry's exposure to regulation is potentially correlated with factors inherent to a
firm-industry (such as technology or size).
The parameter of interest, 3, measures the effect of belonging to a domestic, polluting
industry and the degree to which a firm-industry operates in nonattainment counties on a firm's
FDI. In the simplest case, where each firm manufactures in only one industry and one county in
the United States, this specification would reduce to a simple differences-in-differences model,
where Regpit is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm-industry was regulated and 33
captures the variation in foreign production specific to firms in domestic, polluting industries
(relative to non-polluters) in nonattainment counties (relative to attainment ones). However, in
any given year, a firm may operate in multiple U.S. Counties (the average multinational in the
sample manufactures in 6 U.S. Counties per year). Rather than simply indicating whether the
firm-industry is regulated, the regulation variable measures the percentage of a firm-industry's
U.S. operations that are regulated, thereby allowing the model to fully exploit differences in a
firm-industry's exposure to regulation.
In summary, the estimated regulation effects are purged of many likely sources of bias
associated with transitory shocks to an industry, inherent firm by industry characteristics,
and transitory shocks to a firm. However, the estimated regulation effects are not robust to
transitory determinants of FDI specific to firms in dirty industries that are primarily located
in nonattainment counties. In other words, the results are subject to bias if we believe that
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the main effect of manufacturing in a nonattainment county differs for firms in clean and dirty
industries.
1.3.2 Measuring Environmental Regulation
This section details the construction of the firm by industry regulation variable, Regfit, and how
the assumptions underlying its construction affect the interpretation of the empirical results.
I compute Regfit as the percentage of a firm's U.S. plants, within each industrial segment,
that were effectively regulated for any pollutant under the CAAA. For each of the four cri-
teria pollutants, I divide industries into two categories: emitting and non-emitting. I follow
Greenstone (2002) and define an industry as pollutant-emitting if the industry contributed 7%
or more to total industrial emissions of the pollutant (Table 1). Using this rule, U.S. plants
manufacturing in emitting industries collectively account for between 72 and 91% of the total
U.S. industrial emissions of each criteria pollutant.
I define an individual plant p as regulated for pollutant z if it belongs to an industry i that
emits z (Indpiz=1), and it is located in a county c that is in nonattainment for pollutant z at
given time t (Nonattainptz=1):
Indpiz * Nonattainpctz = 1
where z belongs to the set of criteria pollutants CO, 03, SO2 , TSP}. Accordingly, I define a
plant as regulated for any pollutant if the following condition is satisfied:
(az Indpiz * Nonattainpctz) > 0
For each firm "'T' by industry "i" by year "t," I sum the number of regulated U.S. plants
and divide this by the number of a firm's U.S. plants in that industry (Nfit). This gives the
percentage of a firm's U.S. plants that were regulated within each of its industrial segments:
Reg it Nfit = * (E (Indpiz * Nonattainptz) > ) * 100
where () is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the U.S. plant faces regulation
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for at least one pollutant. l °
The remainder of this section highlights several core assumptions implicit in the construction
of Regfit. First, Regfit restricts the effect of regulation in non-emitting industries to be zero.
As a result, the estimated regulation effect heavily relies on the cutoff used to divide industries
into the emitting and non-emitting categories. The sensitivity of the result to the 7% cutoff is
explored in Section 4.7.
Second,, the regulation variable assumes that all manufacturing plants within an emitting
industry actually emit that pollutant and may, therefore, be affected by regulation (and, simi-
larly, that all manufacturing plants in non-emitting industries do not emit and are unregulated).
For the most part, plant-level emissions data are unavailable, hindering the classification of in-
dividual plants as emitters or non-emitters.1 l However, even if these data were available, it
is unclear whether plant-level emissions data would provide a better estimate of an individual
plant's exposure to regulation. Plants in nonattainment counties are required to reduce emis-
sions. A plant that has reduced emissions in response to regulation may be incorrectly labeled
as a non-emitter, and thus wrongly classified as unregulated.
Third, because I count each plant only once in Regfit, I implicitly assume that the average
costs of regulation are identical for each plant, regardless of the number of pollutants for which
the plant faces regulation. Furthermore, each pollutant is weighted equally in Regfit. Thus, I
assume that; the average compliance costs of regulation are identical for each pollutant. Section
4.5 relaxes both these assumptions by allowing each of the four regulatory programs to impact
foreign production separately.
Finally, I assume that each plant affects a firm's foreign investment decisions regardless of
individual characteristics of the plant (plant size, age of the plant). In Section 4.7, I construct
an alternative measure of a firm's exposure to regulation as a function of plant characteristics.
'OA simple example of how the regulations are calculated is provided in an Appendix.
1 Starting i 1987, a sample of plant level emissions data became available (Toxic Release Inventory). However,
it is not altogether clear how to match this plant-level data to the level of a firm, and this source does not include
data on all criteria pollutants.
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1.3.3 Data
This paper brings together a variety of data sources to determine the impact of domestic
environmental regulations on the foreign manufacturing outcomes of U.S. multinational firms.
This section describes the sources and structure of the data.
Regulation Data
The attainment/nonattainment data are taken from the Code of Federal Regulations and the
EPA's national pollution monitoring network.12 All counties are considered to be in "attain-
ment" prior to 1972, because the CAAA were not fully enforced until late 1971. For all years
between 1972 and 1977, a county is labeled as nonattainment if it had a pollution monitoring
reading that exceeded the relevant federal standard in the appropriate year. Since the EPA
has not maintained historical records of the designations prior to 1978, these data provide the
closest approximation of nonattainment designation in this period. After 1978, the data are
taken directly from the Code of Federal regulations. 13
Figure 1.1A plots the number of counties with a nonattainment designation for each pol-
lutant over time; vertical lines indicate years for which investment data (described below) are
available. The figure clearly illustrates that the Ozone (03) regulatory program was the most
pervasive, followed by particulate matter (TSP). The number of nonattainment counties peaked
in the late 1970s-early 1980s, due to factors such as the deterioration of air quality in attainment
counties and the EPA's increasing awareness of which counties exceeded federal standards. With
the exception of small increases in the number of nonattainment counties in the early 1990s,
the number of nonattainment counties has steadily declined after 1980.14
Figure 1.1B plots the number of counties that experienced a change in status over the
following year. In addition to being the period where regulation was most pervasive, the 1970
to early 1980 period also saw the greatest county-level fluctuations in nonattainment status. For
12Michael Greenstone generously provided these data.
'
3The 1972-1977 estimated data are an underestimate of the scope of the regulations. Many counties lacked
pollution monitoring equipment. In this case, a county was labeled as in "attainment." In the robustness section,
I explore the sensitivity of the results to the estimated data; as a preview, the results remain unchanged.
14Prior to 1979, the ozone standard prohibited the second highest daily maximum concentration from exceeding
.08 parts per million. In 1979, the standard dropped to .12, partly explaining the subsequent decline in ozone-
nonattainment counties.
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example, prior to 1985, approximately 110 counties experienced a change in ozone designation
over the previous year; this number fell to 45 during the subsequent period.
Foreign Direct Investment Data
Foreign manufacturing outcomes are obtained from confidential, affiliate level data collected by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce on the activities
of U.S. based multinational firms. A multinational firm is defined as the combination of a
single U.S. entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one
foreign business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate. Because the International Investment
and Trade in Services Survey Act ensures that the "use of an individual company's data for
tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is prohibited," the BEA believes survey responses are
overwhelmingly truthful, and that the coverage of data is unusually complete. Moreover, since
the data contain the percentage of each parent's ownership in each affiliate, it is possible to
determine ownership stakes in the presence of indirect ownership, providing the most accurate
available picture of U.S. investment positions abroad.
The BEA surveys can be linked across years, creating a comprehensive panel on the financial
and operating characteristics of U.S. firms manufacturing abroad. Extensive data are available
for 1966,15 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999, when the BEA conducted benchmark surveys. 16
The selection criterion for the survey varied across years, causing the data to be censored. In
1966, all foreign affiliates with sales, assets, or net income in excess of $50000 in absolute value
were required to report to the BEA. The cutoff jumped to $0.5 million in 1977, $3 million
in 1982-1994, and $7 million in 1999.17 To rectify this, I imposed a uniform censoring point
($5.591 million 1982 USD) across all years. 18
'
5While researchers have extensively used the 1977-1999 data, the affiliate-level 1966 data have not previously
been used for academic research. Significant changes were made between the 1966 and 1977 survey, complicating
the analysis (parent identification codes changed, industry classification codes were more aggregated, etc).
16 Starting in 1983, annual surveys were conducted, but since the cutoff for participation was significantly
higher than in benchmark years, the annual surveys were not used in the analysis.
1
'The rise in the cutoff is attributed to paperwork reduction laws.
18The level of assets falling below the cutoff comprises a minimal percentage (0.38%) of total assets abroad,
suggesting that the bottom-coding problem is negligible (estimated from the 1999 FDI data). Nonetheless,
missing "middle" years were interpolated to mitigate problems associated with censored data. The percentage
of interpolated data is low (less than .5% of the firm-industry-year observations), and the results are robust to
the interpolation.
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I substantially reorganized the survey data in two ways. First, to create measures of a U.S.
based multinational's scope of foreign manufacturing within each industrial segment (assets,
plant and property expenditures, expenditures to produce goods, etc.), I computed the U.S.
parent's ownership stake in each foreign affiliate, and then aggregated the data from the foreign
affiliates to the level of the U.S. parent firm, by industry and year.19 To calculate a firm's foreign
capital in each industrial segment, total foreign affiliate assets were multiplied by the percentage
of affiliate sales in each industry. While this methodology represented the best approximation
of capital use given the data limitations, it is subject to measurement error if the capital to
labor ratios vary significantly across industries. In this case, this approach may systematically
underestimate the foreign capital dedicated to capital-intensive industries.
Second, the FDI data include a firm-year observation only if the firm had foreign assets, sales
or income in that year. An analysis using only these data would fail to capture, for example, a
heavily regulated multinational firm that did not produce abroad in a given year, biasing the
estimated regulation effects upwards. To remove this potential bias, I completed the panel: for
each firm, I obtained the birth and closure dates from a variety of electronic and print sources.20
If a firm operated in the United States in a given year, but was absent from the survey data, I
assigned the firm "zero" FDI for that year. As such, the empirical work presented in this paper
captures both channels through which regulation impacts a multinational's foreign production
choices. First, the analysis captures whether a firm will move abroad in response to regulation
or, in other words, whether a firm will become a multinational. Second, it determines whether
a firm that already produces abroad will increase its foreign production activities in response
to regulation.
This study does not include firms that never produced abroad between the years of 1966
and 1999. Thus, while the regulation effects derived in this paper provide a good estimate of a
multinational's response to regulation, the effects are most likely an overstatement for the entire
universe of firms. However, from a policy standpoint, we care most about the multinational
response to regulation. Other firms have such high barriers to foreign production that realistic
19Industrial classifications are based on ISI classifications, giving 45 industries in manufacturing.
20Firm births and closures were mainly taken from various volumes of Moody's Industrials and firm websites.
These data sources were supplemented by Hoover's Company Database, bankruptcy articles, and several addi-
tional sources. The 5% of firms who were either missing a birth date, closure date, or both, were assigned to be
operating for the duration in which investment data was available.
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levels of regulation may never cause them to produce abroad. 2 1
Figures 1.2A and 1.2B graph the foreign assets allocated to manufacturing by U.S. based
multinationals overall and excluding high income, OECD countries for the years 1966-1999.22
The figures split foreign assets by pollution-intensive industries versus clean industries. After
1982, foreign assets in clean industries grew at a relatively faster rate. This is not surprising,
as it has been suggested that, due to the nature of their technologies, industries with the
largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the least footloose (Ederington, Levinson
and Minier, 2003). The figures illustrate that the trend in FDI for pollution intensive and
clean industries differs, implying that an analysis simply comparing the effect of environmental
regulations on FDI across industries may suffer from bias associated with these trends.
Plant Data
To compute the regulation variable, I use data on the location and the industry of a firm's U.S.
manufacturing facilities. I manually matched the firms in the BEA foreign investment data
to detailed U.S. manufacturing facility data. The Census Bureau's Census of Manufacturing
is the most comprehensive facility level data collected, but it was unavailable for this study.
Alternatively, I obtained data from a yearly series of print manufacturing directories entitled
"Marketing Economics Key Plants." The directories include 10% of U.S. facilities (about 40,000
facilities per year), which account for approximately 80% of value added in U.S. manufacturing.
The patterns in the "Marketing Economics" sample are quite similar to patterns in other
U.S. manufacturing facility data. In Figure 3, I graph the percentage of emitting plants located
in a nonattainment county from the Marketing Economics Data and the County Business
Patterns, for 1994. Although the County Business Patterns data include many more plants,
the two datasets exhibit near identical patterns in industrial composition and in the percentage
of emitting plants that reside in nonattainment counties.23 In addition, though the "Marketing
21To obtain data on firms that had never invested abroad during this period, I matched Compustat to the
BEA data. However, the match was poor for a variety of reasons. First, the BEA data includes private firms,
while Compustat does not. Second, the Compustat data for the 1960s and 1970s was not comprehensive. Third,
the level of firm level aggregation differs between the two data sets. The effective match rate between Compustat
and the BEA data was about 50%. Due to these data limitations and the differences in observable characteristics
between multinationals and other firms, I decided to limit the analysis to multinationals.
22I use the World Bank definition for high income, OECD country.
23Figure 3 holds for other years as well; for brevity, only information from 1994 is presented.
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Economics" sample only includes large plants (100 or more employees), it should still provide an
accurate picture of the number of a firm's plants that were significantly affected by regulation:
Becker and Henderson (2000) provide anecdotal evidence that the inspection and enforcement
activities of the CAAA centered on large plants.
For each manufacturing plant in the Marketing Economics directories, I coded the firm
name, state code, county code, SIC code and approximate employment. Next, each firm-year
observation in the BEA data was manually matched to the U.S. manufacturing facilities that
the firm operated at the time of the previous benchmark survey: firms in the 1999 survey
were matched to plant data in 1994, firms in the 1994 survey were matched to plant data
in 1989, etc.2 4 Changes in company names and subsidiaries were tracked using a series of
print and electronic sources.2 5 Despite the interest in understanding the interaction between
manufacturing patterns in the United States and outbound FDI, this is, to my knowledge, the
first time the BEA's outbound FDI dataset has been linked to detailed information on the
location of the multinationals' manufacturing facilities within the United States.
Firms indicating that their primary SIC code was either banking or services were eliminated
from the analysis. Out of the remaining firms, 67% (2235) were matched to at least one
manufacturing plant.2 6 The final sample was drawn from these 2235 firms.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are shown in Table 1.2. All monetary variables are
in thousands of 1982 dollars. The analysis in this paper used 56,385 firm by industry by year
observations from 2,235 firms. If a firm never manufactured in an industry at home nor abroad,
I exclude the firm-industry from the analysis, causing the number of observations included per
firm to vary. However, this exclusion should not significantly alter the results, as the estimated
coefficient on regulation (Regfi(t_k)) is conditional on having operated at least one U.S. plant
within an industry in a given year (Indfi(tk)).
24There are 2 exemptions from this rule: Firms in the 1977 data set were matched to the 1966 plant directory,
but if a firm had no plants listed in the 1966 plant directory, the firm was matched to its corresponding 1972
plants-the first effective year of the regulation. Second, the directories began in 1966, and, as a result, firms in
1966 were matched to their 1966 plant data in order to obtain data for county and industry codes.
25Hoover's Online Premium Directory, Moody's Industrials, Firm websites, Lexus-Nexus, etc.
26The majority of unmatched firms listed their primary SIC codes as nonmanufacturing.
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The first two columns of Table 1.2 include FDI in all countries, while the second two columns
exclude FDI to high income, OECD Nations. Several key patterns emerge from the table. First,
the level of multinational activity in high income countries dwarfs the activity in other nations.
For example, the average firm-industry's foreign assets excluding high income countries (7612)
is less than a quarter of all foreign assets (37118).
Second, a firm-industry that hold assets abroad in a given year is more likely to be regulated
in the past (7% of plants regulated) than the overall average (6%). However, because of variation
in the regulation variable, I cannot reject that the hypothesis that this difference is zero.
Finally, the Ozone (03) program was most pervasive, and, therefore, it follows that the
average firm-industry is disproportionately regulated for 03 (5.35%).
1.4 Regression Results
I begin by presenting regression results on the effect of firm by industry regulation on foreign
assets (Section 4.1) and other selected outcome measures (Section 4.2). Second, I test whether
U.S. regulation causes firms to disproportionately move to developing countries (Section 4.3).
Third, I determine whether the impact of regulation varies by pollutant (Section 4.4) and
whether the impact is larger for certain industries (Section 4.5). Fourth, I aggregate the firm-
industry data to the level of the firm in order to determine whether firm-level regulation affects
FDI (Section 4.6). I conclude with a series of specification checks (Section 4.7).
1.4.1 The Effect of the CAAA on Foreign Assets
This section documents the impact of the CAAA on a firm's foreign assets in its polluting
segments. I first present the results using only the cross-sectional variation in the data, and
then present the full panel analysis.
Table 1.3 gives the results from estimating Equation 1, over the 1966-1999 time period, where
the foreign assets of a firm by industry by year is the dependent variable. The main coefficient
of interest, 33, is presented; a positive value of /13 implies that a firm increases its foreign assets
in dirty industries in response to CAAA regulation. For ease of interpretation, the table also
includes the mean elasticity of the regulation. The columns correspond to specifications that
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include different sets of controls; the exact controls are noted at the bottom of the table. As
the regulation effects are derived from the interaction of manufacturing in a heavily polluting
industry in the United States and residing in a nonattainment county, the main effects of
manufacturing in a domestic industry (Indfi(t_k)) and manufacturing in a nonattainment county
(Nonfi(tk)) are always included. The mean foreign assets for a firm-industry is $37,188,000.
The Column 1 specification presents the estimated regulation effect from exploiting the
pooled cross-sectional variation in the data. In other words, I exclude firm by industry, industry
by year, and firm by year fixed effects. The estimated effect of regulation is large (735.35) and
highly significant.2 7 The Column 2 specification adds industry by year fixed effects (it), which
purge the estimated regulation effects of all transitory differences in the mean foreign assets
across industries. This estimate is not significantly different than the estimate presented in
Column 1. However, firms tend to invest abroad in industries in which they manufacture at
home, and therefore the industry at home variables included in the specification in Column 1
(Indfi(tk)) may have already captured the trend in FDI, by foreign industry.
In the specifications presented in Columns 1 and 2, the estimated regulation effect may
simply capture the difference in FDI between firms. For example, suppose that larger firms
are more likely to be regulated and more likely to manufacture abroad. Then, the estimated
coefficient would potentially confound the regulation effect with firm size. In the specification
reported in Column 3, I take advantage of the panel structure of the data and include firm
by industry fixed effects. The estimate of 3 falls from 735 in Column 2 to 320 in Column
3. This difference suggests that firm specific factors are an important determinant of FDI,
and therefore, estimates of the regulation effect using cross-sectional data, where it is difficult
to control for unobserved factors across firm by industry groups, may overstate the effect of
environmental regulation on FDI.
Column 4 reports results from including industry by year, firm by industry, and firm by year
fixed effects.28 In this specification, the coefficient estimate on regulation is purged of possible
sources of bias associated with transitory shocks to an industry, inherent firm by industry
27Constraining the effect of the industries at home and nonattainment variables to be constant over time
produced similar results to Table 4A, but are omitted for brevity. All omitted results can be obtained from the
author upon request.
28For computational ease, the data are demeaned using the two-way fixed effects model, and standard errors
are appropriately adjusted.
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characteristics, and transitory shocks to a firm. The estimate of P3, which is similar to Column
3, indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the lagged percentage of plants regulated
in an industry leads to a $329,000 increase in a firm's stock of foreign assets in that industry
(significant at the 5% level). This corresponds to a 0.9% increase in foreign assets for the
average firm-industry. To put these numbers into context, suppose that the average level of
regulation is imposed upon a previously unregulated firm-industry (i.e. 6% of a firm-industry's
plants are now regulated). The model predicts that the firm would increase its foreign assets
in that industrial segment by 5.3%.29
The estimated regulation effect captures two channels through which regulation may affect
FDI: by inducing a firm to invest abroad the first time and by motivating a firm to increase
manufacturing at a previously existing plant. I estimated the effect of regulation on a dummy
variable for whether the firm-industry manufactured abroad in a given year. The results (not
shown here) suggest that regulations do not increase the probability that a firm will invest
abroad. Rather, regulation causes firms to increase manufacturing at already existing manu-
facturing plants.
Potential (spurious) correlations may exist between regulation and a firm's foreign assets
in an industry, if the total number of U.S. plants a firm-industry operates in a given year is
correlated with its foreign assets. Specifically, operating more plants raises the probability of
operating a plant in a nonattainment county, while simultaneously decreasing the probability of
operating only "regulated" plants. Firm by industry fixed effects control for these correlations
between firms (as they remove average firm by industry characteristics), but do not control
for changes within a firm (since the number of plants a firm operates can change over time).
Similarly, the firm by time fixed effects control for plant growth across all of a firm's industrial
segments, but do not control for disproportionate plant growth in one segment. To test whether
this potential correlation drives the results, the specification in Column 5 controls for the lagged
number of plants a firm operates in a given year. The results remain virtually unchanged.
I conclude this section by presenting the estimated coefficients of the CAAA under an alter-
29The regressions were run on the level of assets, and the mean elasticity of regulation is presented. Transform-
ing the data by the log function would constrain the effect of regulation to be proportional to the firm's foreign
assets, ensuring that the magnitude of the regulation effect was not simply driven by the largest firms. However,
the data include a large fraction of zeros for years in which the firms did not invest abroad in an industry, and
therefore, the log function is not appropriate.
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native assumption regarding the timing of regulation effects on FDI. The regulation measure
in Table 1.3 assumed that only regulations from the year of the last investment survey affects
the FDI decisions of firms (for example, regulation in 1977 affected investment in 1982, but
regulation in 1978-1981 does not). I made this assumption because there are typically delays in
enforcement activities when a county falls into nonattainment, and there may also be a delayed
response of investment to regulation. 3 0 Alternatively, I construct the average level of regulation
(weighed by year) during the period prior to the investment, and determine whether this new
regulation measure impacts foreign assets (Appendix Table Al). The point estimates presented
in Table 1.A1 are not significantly different than those presented in Table 3.
1.4.2 The Effect of the CAAA on Other Foreign Production Outcomes
This section documents the effect of the CAAA regulation on other measures of foreign pro-
duction. Table 1.4 presents the results from the specification that controls for firm by industry,
firm by year, and industry by year fixed effects. Therefore, the estimated regulation coefficients
are comparable with Table 1.3, Column 4. For ease of interpretation, the mean elasticity of
regulation is also presented.
Column 1 reports the estimation results for an alternative measure of a firm's capital stock:
plant and property expenditures (PPE). In addition to including the physical capital stock of
the foreign affiliate, the asset variable includes the affiliate's equity investments in other firms.
In contrast, the PPE measure only includes the physical capital stock (land, machinery, etc),
perhaps providing a less noisy measure of foreign production activities. The coefficient on
regulation is positive (125) and significant at the 1% level.
Next, I investigate the effect of regulation on a multinational's foreign output. Although
changes in a firm's foreign capital stock may provide evidence on permanent changes in foreign
production, they may not capture transitory changes in foreign manufacturing during a given
year. Suppose that a firm's manufacturing facility operates at less than full capacity. 31 A firm
30 Berman and Bui (1998 and 2001) document that the plant level regulations associated with nonattainment
status often set compliance dates a number of years in advance.
31It has been well documented that many plants operate under capacity, and that capacity utilization move-
ments are not random, but can be viewed as systematic results of a rational economic optimization process
undertaken by the firm. In particular, multifactor productivity tends to be procyclical (Berndt and Morrison,
1981; Morrison 1985).
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may, thus, increase production by more fully utilizing existing capital structures, rather than
investing in new equipment. In this case, using the foreign capital stock as a measure of foreign
production would cause a downward biased measure of the regulation effect. In addition, the
assets and PPE variables are recorded through a book value system. This system permanently
records the value of an investment at its purchase price, and the value is never updated to
reflect inflation or changes in the goods market value. Because this system overstates the
relative contribution of a recent investment (which is entered in current dollars), the increase
in foreign capital as a fraction of total capital may be an upwardly biased measure of current
production levels. A firm's foreign output does not suffer from either bias, and, therefore, may
provide a better measure of transitory changes in production.
Column 2 and 3 report the estimation results for two measures foreign output: the real
expenditures on foreign goods and services and the real foreign Gross Product, respectively.
Once again, 3 is positive and significant (point estimates of 702 and 290, and mean elasticities
of 1.5 and 2.1 respectively). This implies that imposing the mean level of firm by industry reg-
ulation causes the average firm to increase its foreign output (as measured by the expenditures
on goods and services) by roughly 9% within a polluting industry.
In Column 4, I test whether a firm increases imports from its foreign affiliates in response
to tougher environmental regulation. A firm may utilize FDI as a means of penetrating a lo-
cal market, or, alternatively, to produce goods for export. In the context of this study, it is
interesting to understand whether the United States was the final destination of the additional
foreign goods produced in response to regulation, and hence whether imports substituted do-
mestic production. It is worth mentioning that although a foreign affiliate can export directly to
other companies within the United States, roughly one-third of world trade is intra-firm trade
(Antras, 2003) and, in our particular sample, sales to the U.S. parent firm account for 62% of all
sales to the United States. As such, this is an important indicator of whether a firm substitutes
foreign goods for its own domestic production. The effect of regulation on intra-firm trade is
positive (131) and economically significant: a 1 percentage point increase in regulation leads
to 1.6% increase in imports by the average firm by industry. However, this is not precisely
estimated.
Finally, Column 5 reports the estimation result where the real sales from the foreign affiliate
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to the United States, through any firm, is the dependent variable; the coefficient is positive (99),
but not precisely estimated.
1.4.3 The Relative Impacts of Regulation on FDI to Developing Countries
This section addresses whether environmental regulations alter the international location deci-
sions of polluters. In particular, opponents of U.S. environmental regulation fear that regulation
forces firms to shift manufacturing to developing countries, which are generally less able or less
willing to impose tough environmental policies (pollution havens or race to the bottom effects).
If this concern is justified, U.S. environmental policies may have significant distributional im-
pacts, as pollution and jobs shift to developing nations.
Economic theory, however, does not necessarily predict that firms will disproportionately
increase investment to developing nations. The regulations do not alter conditions (interest
rates, costs) across foreign nations, and therefore, at the margin, we would not automatically
expect a change in the distribution of a firm's foreign portfolio. Furthermore, even if the
regulations motivate a firm to invest in countries with weaker standards, the firm may not
necessarily increase production in a developing country. A firm's location choice depends upon
a variety of factors that affect the business environment, of which environmental law is only
one; for example, a firm that requires a flexible workforce might not invest in a country that
has the weakest environmental laws if it also has the most rigid labor laws.
The empirical evidence on whether multinationals invest in developing nations to exploit
weaker environmental policies is mixed. Gamper-Rabindran and Jha (2004) show that after
India's 1991 liberalization, there were greater inflows of FDI into dirty industries relative to
cleaner ones. On the other hand, Eskeland and Harrison (1997) find little evidence that foreign
investors are concentrated in dirty sectors, and show that foreign plants are actually more
energy efficient than domestic plants in Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco, and Cote D'Ivoire.
In Figure 1.4, I plot the average ratio of foreign assets in developing nations to total foreign
assets, by polluting and clean industries. For all years, the ratio is higher for clean industries.
There is not a discernible change in the difference in ratios over time, confirming Eskeland and
Harrison's result that dirty U.S. industries are not disproportionately increasing their concen-
tration in developing countries.
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In Table 1.5 and 1.6, I present statistical evidence on whether firms will relocate to de-
veloping countries when they are faced with more stringent environmental regulation. Table
1.5 replicates the regression results presented in Table 3 and 4, excluding FDI to high-income,
OECD countries. I find evidence that multinationals invest in developing countries when faced
with higher levels of U.S. regulation. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the lagged
percentage of regulated plants corresponds to a $59,000 (for the average firm, 0.8%) increase in
the stock of foreign assets within a firm's polluting segment. This estimate is significant at the
15% level. However, the mean elasticity of foreign assets to regulation in developing countries
(0.8%) is not noticeably different than the mean elasticity (0.9%) for all countries.
Table 1.6 presents a formal test of whether multinationals disproportionately increase FDI
to the developing world in response to regulation. I re-estimate equation 1 with the ratio of
FDI in less developed countries to total FDI as the dependent variable. For each outcome
measure, the mean of the dependent variable is listed in brackets at the top of the table. Across
all outcomes, the results are indistinguishable from zero, implying that the share of a firm's
investment in poorer countries is not determined by U.S. environmental regulations.
1.4.4 Individual Pollutants
If abatement costs vary by pollutant, each pollutant-specific regulatory program (CO, 03,
SO2, and TSP) should have a distinct effect on FDI. In particular, one would expect FDI to
disproportionately increase in response to regulation of pollutants with high marginal abatement
costs.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure marginal abatement costs by pollutant. In general,
abatement cost data come from manufacturing plant surveys, but plants may be unable to
separate costs by pollutant if equipment can abate multiple pollutants. Moreover, Hartman,
Wheeler and Singh (1994) have documented that the marginal cost of pollution abatement varies
across industry. For example, in the Paper Industry, the marginal cost of pollution abatement
is highest for O3/CO (214 USD '79 per ton of reduced emissions), while in the Agricultural
Chemical Industry, marginal O3/CO abatement (158) is cheaper than SO2 (285). As a result,
it is difficult to rank individual pollutants by their marginal abatement costs.
More recent evidence suggests that, in practice, the CO regulatory program disproportion-
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ately retarded the growth of manufacturing (Greenstone, 2002). This implies that it may be
the most costly of the four regulatory regimes.
In order to estimate the separate effects of each regulatory program on foreign production,
I compute four measures of pollutant specific regulation:
RegZfit = N f * (Indpiz * Nonattainpt) > 0 * 100
This measure is similar in attributes to Regfit, and can be interpreted as the percentage of a
firm's U.S. plants in an industrial segment that are regulated for pollutant Z.
For each pollutant, I estimate Equation 1, replacing Regfi(t_k) with the pollutant-specific
measure of firm by industry regulation:
Yfit = o + flIndfi(t-k) + 2No°nZfi(t-k) + 3 RegZfi(t-k) + afi + 6ft + 7lit + Efit (1.2)
Note that Equation 2 differs from Equation 1 in that Nonfi(t-k) has been replaced by NonZfi(t_k),
which is defined as the percentage of plants in a nonattainment county for pollutant Z.
Columns 1 - 4 of Table 1.7 present the results from estimating Equation 2 for each of the
4 regulatory programs. The CO program appears to have the largest effect (514, significant
at 15%), followed by 03 (275, significant at 5%). The coefficients on regulation for the TSP
(Column 3) and SO2 (Column 4) programs are indistinguishable from zero.
Equation 2 captures the effect of each regulatory program on FDI; however, many plants
are subject to more than one of the nonattainment designations, and as such the coefficient
estimates in Equation 2 may potentially confound the effects of each of the nonattainment
designations. Alternatively, I estimate the effect of each regulatory program, holding constant
the effect of regulation for other pollutants:
Yfit = o + lIndfi(t-k) + Z 2 NonZfi(t-k) + > 13zRegZfi(t-k) + fi + 6ft +7it + Efit (1.3)
Column 5 presents the estimates of the coefficients of interest (3CO, 303, 3S0 2' and
/3TSP) from Equation 3. Once again, CO and 03 regulation have significant effects on FDI,
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while the estimated effect of TSP and SO2 regulation are indistinguishable from zero. The esti-
mates do not significantly differ from estimating the effect of each regulatory regime separately,
suggesting that the marginal effect of regulation for a second pollutant is equal to the average
effect of being regulated for that pollutant.
Overall, the results found in this exercise are consistent with prior work: the previous
literature found that CO regulation had the largest effect on domestic production, and therefore,
we would also expect CO regulation to have the largest impact on foreign production. Moreover,
the 03 program was the most prevalent regulatory program within the United States, with
the largest number of counties affected. A firm trying to evade regulation would have least
incentive to switch counties within the United States, as the probability of a county falling into
nonattainment for 03 is higher than for other pollutants.
1.4.5 Exploring the Heterogeneity across Industries
In this section, I explore whether the effect of environmental regulation varies across industrial
characteristics. In particular, I focus on whether the regulation effect varies with the extent of
an industry's import penetration within the United States.
Industries with high import penetration, roughly defined as the ratio of imports to domestic
production, may react substantially more to regulation for a variety of reasons: less protective
measures of trade, a U.S. comparative disadvantage in that industry, etc. Using the NBER trade
database, I construct a measure of import penetration as the ratio of the value of U.S. imports
to the value of U.S. shipments, by industry (IMPENi). To smooth temporary fluctuations,
the ratio is averaged over eight years (1958-1965). I then interact IMPENi with the firm by
industry environmental regulation variable (Regfi(tk)):
Yfit = o0 + /3 Indfi(t-k) + /3 2Nonfi(t-k)+ (1.4)
+33lRegfi(t-k) + /32 IMPENi -+ 33(Regfi(t-k) * IMPENi) + afi + 5ft + 7it + Efit
The parameter of interest, 33, captures the additional impact of regulation for high import
penetration industries (Pulp and Paper, Petrol Refining, Lumber) relative to low import pene-
tration industries (Newspapers, Fabricated Metals).
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Table 1.8 presents the results from estimating Equation 4 for selected outcome measures.
Column 1 presents the results where the dependent variable is a firm-industry's foreign assets;
/333 is positive (86) and significant. This implies that regulation has larger effects for firms in
dirty, high import penetration industries relative to dirty, low importation industries.
In Column 2, I replace the import penetration ratio with a dummy variable indicating
whether the industry is above median import penetration. The results are striking-the effects
of regulation can be predominately attributed to high import penetration industries (629).
Columns 3 and 4 present the coefficient estimates based on the specifications where the expen-
ditures on foreign goods and services is the dependent variable, while Columns 5 and 6 present
them for intra-firm trade. These results indicate that firms increase foreign output in response
to regulation relatively more in industries in which imports have historically accounted for a
large percentage of U.S. consumption.
1.4.6 Firm Level Regression
As an alternative strategy, I estimate the effect of regulation on a firm's total foreign production,
rather than the effect on a firm's production within an industrial segment. In particular, I fit
the following equation to firm level data:
Yft -+ - 1Ind(t_(k) + 2N 3Rg(t-k) + Of + Vt + Efit (1.5)
where Reg(,_k) is the lagged percentage of a firm's U.S. plants under regulation, Ind*(t_k) isf g(t-k) f (t-k
a vector of dummies that control for the firm's domestic industries, Non(t_k) controls for the
percentage of plants a firm has in a nonattainment county, is a firm fixed effect and vt is a
year fixed effect.
Regulation effects calculated at the level of the firm can be informative if there are spillover
effects from dirty to clean industries. Foreign investment tends to be lumpy, primarily due
to the fixed costs of investing abroad. If a firm facing tougher regulation at home is more
likely to pay the fixed costs of creating infrastructure abroad, it may be easier for that firm to
manufacture across all industries. However, the firm-level results may be misleading if regulated
firms shift simply foreign resources from clean to dirty industries. In this case, even if total
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foreign production remained constant, a reallocation between industries would have considerable
effects on pollution patterns and welfare.
The results of the firm level regressions are presented in Table 1.9. An increase in CAAA
regulation causes a significant increase in the total foreign capital stock and foreign output of
a firm; the effect on sales is indistinguishable from zero.
1.4.7 Specification Checks
I probed the robustness of the estimates to determine the sensitivity of the results (Table 1.10),
but I found little evidence contradicting the basic conclusions of this paper. Each cell is the
coefficient estimate of 3 from Equation 1. Each row represents a different outcome measure,
while each column represents a different specification. All regressions include firm by industry,
firm by year, and industry by firm fixed effects, and are therefore comparable to the results
presented in Table 4 (Column 5) and Table 5.
Employment Weighted Regulation
In constructing Regfit, I restricted the effect of regulation to be identical for each of the firm by
industry's plants, regardless of the characteristics (such as the size) of the plant. This assump-
tion is tenuous if, for example, a firm finds regulation more costly when its largest plant becomes
subject to regulation. Alternatively, I weight each plant by its approximate employment (Epit)
when constructing the regulation variable, and replace Regfit with an employment-weighted
measure of regulation: 3 2
EmpRegfit - N i * pit  (> E(Indpi * Nonattainptz) > 0)) * 100
, Epit
p-=1
The results, presented in Column 1 of Table 10, remain robust: the regulation effect on
32I lack U.S. plant-level asset data. Otherwise, I would weight each U.S. plant by its assets when constructing
the regulation variable in order to discern whether the decision to increase manufacturing abroad is a function
of the size of the regulated plant.
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foreign capital stock and output are positive and significant, while the effect on sales is positive,
but not precisely estimated.
Estimated Regulation Data
The EPA did not maintain data on the county-level designations between the years 1972 to 1977,
and therefore, predicted data were used in the analysis for these years. However, as Appendix
Figure 1 shows, the predicted data series underestimates the actual number of nonattainment
counties, particularly for 03. To ascertain the sensitivity of the results to the predicted data, I
use the designation of the county in 1978 (the first year of preserved nonattainment designations)
as the designation of the county in 1972 and 1977. The results, presented in Column 2 of Table
1.10, remain robust.
Lower Cutoff for Emissions Standards
I label an industry to be an "emitter" of a pollutant if the industry contributed 7% or more
to industrial emissions of that pollutant. My analysis relies on the comparison between non-
emitters and emitters, and, therefore, it is important that the assignment rule correctly classifies
industries, as misclassification will bias the estimated regulation effects. In Table 1.10, Column
3, I present the estimation of Equation 1 where an industry is labeled an emitter if the industry
has contributed 4.5% or more to industrial emissions. The results remain robust, largely because
the change from the 7% to 4.5% cutoff does not cause many industries to flip from the non-
emitting to emitting category.
Varying Sample Construction
In Table 1.10, Columns 4 and 5, I determine the sensitivity of the regulation estimates to sample
construction. First, I re-estimate equation 1 for firms that operated throughout the entire
period. If the CAAA regulations caused firms to shut down, and firms who are anticipating
closure make fewer foreign investments while alive, then the estimated regulation effects would
be biased downward. The point estimates of regulation (Column 4) are larger across all outcome
measures (for example, the effect on foreign assets is now 450 versus 329 in Table 4). However,
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firms that operate throughout the entire period have higher mean FDI (the mean foreign assets
is 44836). As such, the mean elasticity of FDI to regulation does not differ from the full sample.
Second, in the early years of regulation, the regulations were unanticipated. In later years,
firms for whom the regulations bind may have already left (or avoided) counties that had a
high probability of falling into nonattainment. In this case, firms remaining in nonattainment
counties would be those with negligible marginal pollution abatement costs. As such, the
estimated regression coefficients would be systematically biased downward. In Column 5, I
limit the analysis to the early years of regulation (1966-1982). While the point estimate of
the coefficient are smaller (for example, 136 on foreign assets), firms also tended to invest less
during this period (the mean foreign assets is 17,973). Hence, the mean elasticity during the
early years of regulation is not significantly different from the estimated elasticity for the entire
1966-1999 pIeriod.33
1.5 Discussion
The preceding empirical work provides evidence that U.S. based multinationals increased FDI
in response to U.S. "clean air" policies. Specifically, my analysis suggests that the CAAA
regulations caused the average multinational firm to increase its foreign assets in polluting
industries by 5% and its foreign output by 9%. These findings warrant additional discussion
regarding their meaning and possible welfare implications.
1.5.1 Substitution of U.S. Manufacturing
The findings in this paper suggest that U.S. multinationals may substitute foreign for domestic
production in response to U.S. regulations. In particular, I find that regulation causes firms to
increase both foreign production and intra-firm trade. However, these substitution effects are
small relative to total multinational production in the United States.
I can cornpute the approximate percentage of U.S. multinational activity that this increased
foreign production accounts for. The analysis predicts that U.S. multinationals will increase
33Nonattainment designations in the early period are estimated due to missing data. As such, regulation
estimates in earlier period contain more noise than in later periods.
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their foreign assets by 5.3% in polluting industries in response to the mean CAAA regula-
tion. Therefore, for the year 1977, the regulations amounted to $52 billion of total foreign
assets in polluting industries. 3 4 This increase represents approximately 0.6% of the stock of
multinationals' domestic assets in polluting industries.
1.5.2 Comparison with Tax
Regulation impacts a firm's production decisions by increasing the cost of domestic production,
and can therefore be seen as a production tax. To determine whether the magnitude of the
estimated regulation effect is plausible, I can compare it with a rough estimate of how an
"environmental tax" would impact FDI.
The best estimates currently place U.S. environmental compliance costs at 2% of the total
cost of production (Jaffe, et al, 1995). Prior to the passage of CAAA, the United States had
little environmental regulation, and, therefore, I assume that these costs are fully attributable
to the CAAA regulation. Two percent of costs is roughly equal to 12% of a multinational's
profits (1999 BEA Data). Thus, the CAAA regulation can be viewed as equivalent to a 12%
profit tax.
To my knowledge, an estimate of the tax elasticity of outbound investment is unavailable.
Instead, I use a measure of the inward tax elasticity of investment, -0.6, from Gorden and Hines
(2002) as a proxy for the outbound elasticity. Thus, a 12% environmental tax is associated with
a 6.8% increase in FDI, which is comparable in magnitude to the 5.3% estimate derived in this
paper.
1.5.3 Welfare Implications
This study finds that multinationals may circumvent environmental laws by manufacturing in
alternative locations. Therefore, while country-level policies may reduce local pollution, they
have the potential to leave the level of global pollution unchanged (or, perversely, even increase
it), and may have important distributional consequences.
However, a comprehensive study on who gains (and who loses) from these policies is compli-
cated by several factors. First and foremost, the analysis depends on whether one takes a global
34I use the year 1977 because it is the first year of foreign investment data after the regulations were imposed.
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or a U.S. perspective. U.S. environmental policy shifts manufacturing (and, therefore, pollu-
tion) abroad. Some foreign countries may tolerate higher pollution levels in order to further
economic growth (Krueger & Grossman, 1995), and therefore, it is not obvious that countries
receiving U.S. FDI experience a welfare loss from an increased presence of dirty industries.
From a U.S. perspective, environmental regulation reduces U.S. pollution levels and can
provide significant health benefits and general improvements in the quality of life.3J On the
other hand, these improvements may come at a substantial cost: the cost of production and
employment shifting abroad, externalities from global pollution, and changes in the prices of
consumer goods.
While this study aims to understand the costs of lost production, the calculated regulation
effects can only be used as a guide in determining these costs. First, this study does not
capture all possible changes in foreign production. For example, suppose that domestic firms
cannot compete with foreign firms after regulation. Foreign goods may therefore flood the
market (import substitution) causing U.S. firms to shutdown. Second, I cannot fully predict
the counterfactual. If firms would have eventually shifted production abroad even in the absence
of regulation (and the regulations simply speed up the process), the ensuing welfare effects would
be different than if the firms move solely in response to regulation. Finally, even if production
and jobs shifted abroad, one would expect labor and capital to be reallocated within the United
States. As such, the true costs of regulation depend on the adjustment costs of switching
resources to other sectors.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between environmental regulation and
FDI. I find evidence that the Clean Air Act Regulations caused U.S. based multinational firms
to increase their foreign production in emitting industries. In particular, my analysis predicts
that multinationals increased their foreign assets by 5.3% and their foreign output by 9% in
response to tougher regulation. This increase accounted for roughly 0.6% of the multinationals'
domestic assets in polluting industries. However, contrary to common claims, I find that heavily
35See Smith and Huang (1995); Henderson (1996); Chay and Greenstone (2003); Currie and Neidell (2004).
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regulated firms did not disproportionately increase foreign investment in developing countries.
This paper provides limited evidence that heavily regulated U.S. firms increase imports
from their foreign affiliates in response to regulation. In addition, I find robust evidence that
firms react more strongly to regulation when they operate in an industry where imports have
historically accounted for a large percentage of U.S. consumption. On the whole, these results
are consistent with the theory that regulation causes a firm to substitute foreign for domestic
production.
In light of the recent debates on outsourcing, my results suggest that American environmen-
tal regulations have contributed to the flight of manufacturing. However, these results should
not be misinterpreted as a criticism of environmental law nor a call to reverse environmental
policy within the United States. Substantial research has shown that these policies are effec-
tive at reducing air pollution concentrations and that cleaner air provides substantial monetary
benefits to homeowners and significant health benefits. Thus, it is possible that the welfare
gains from the shifting investment abroad may still outweigh the costs.
1.7 Appendix
To fully understand the construction of Regfit, consider the following example (Appendix Table
1.A2). Firm A operates four plants in the United States: two plants in the Motor Vehicle
Industry and one plant each in the Petrol Refining and Food Industries. For each industrial
segment of a Firm A, Regfit is constructed as follows:
* The Motor Vehicle Industry contributes to 7.4% of industrial emissions of 03, and there-
fore both of Firm A's plants within this industry are considered 03 emitters (IndMotor Vehicle, 03=1).
Since Plant 2 is located in a county that is in attainment for 03, it is "unregulated."
RegFirm A, Motor Vehicle, t equals 50%.
* The Petrol Refining Industry emits both 03 and SO2. Although Plant 3 resides in a
county that is in attainment for 03, its county is in nonattainment of federal standards
for SO2 . Therefore, Plant 3 is considered regulated. Since Plant 3 is the only plant Firm
A operates in the Petrol Refining Industry, RegFirm A, Petrol, t equals 100%.
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* The Food Industry does not emit a criteria pollutant. RegFirm A, Food, t equals 0.
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Figure 1.2A: Foreign Assets in Manufacturing of U.S. Based
Multinationals, by Industrial Pollution Status
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Figure 1.2B: Foreign Assets in Manufacturing excluding High Income,
OECD Nations, by Industrial Pollution Status
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Table 1.1: Which Industries Emit Which Pollutants?
Industry (SIC code) 03 S02 TSP CO
Fabricated Metals (34) x
Inorganic Chemicals (2812-9) x
Iron and Steel (3312-3, 3321-5) x x x x
Lumber and Wood Products (24) x
Motor Vehicles, Bodies and Parts (371) x
Nonferrous Metals (333-4) x x
Organic Chemicals (2861-9) x
Petroleum Refining (2911) x x x
Printing (2711-89) x
Pulp and Paper (2611-31) x x x x
Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products (30) x
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete (32) x x x
Percent of Industrial Emissions Accounted For 80.7% 91.2% 71.90% 84.8%
Notes: (1) Metal and Non-Mining make up approximately 33% of industrial emissions
ofTSP. Since only the manufacturing sector is studies in the paper, these sectors are
omitted from the calculation of the percentage. (2) Ozone regulations consist of
regulation for VOCs and Nitrogen Dixoide. The industries in question account for
80.1 % ofVOCs. While the stone, Clay and Glass industry is responsible for only 2.2%
of VOC emissions, it is responsible for 18.6% of omissions of Nitrogen Dioxide and is
included as an Emitter of 03 (3) Data from EPA Sector Notebooks (1995) and
Greenstone (2002)
Figure 1.3: Plant Data Versus County Business Patterns Data, 1994
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
All Foreign Affiliates
Conditional on
Overall Foreign Assets>0
(1) (2)
37118 162885
(451013) (933916)
Variable
Foreign Assets
Plant and Property Expenditures
Costs of Goods and Services
Gross Product
Sales From Foreign Affiliates to U.S. Firm
Sales From Foreign Affiliates to U.S.
Firm by Industry Regulation (Regfi)
Firm by Industry Regulation: COfi,
Firm by Industry Regulation: Ofit
Firm by Industry Regulation: SOfit
Firm by Industry Regulation: TSPfi,
12148
(172855)
45903
(728007)
53309
(359069)
201436
(1514785)
14149 62092
(340721) (711683)
8109 36193
(307384) (649205)
13216 57995
(320534) (669544)
5.99
(22.24)
0.48
(6.02)
5.35
(21.10)
0.39
(5.38)
0.93
(8.65)
7.16
(22.76)
0.49
(5.10)
6.33
(21.53)
0.53
(5.59)
0.94
(7.69)
Notes: (1) The level of observation is a firm by industry by year (for 2235 firms). Col I
Excluding Affiliates in High
Income, OECD Nations
Conditional on
Overall
(3)
7612
(103110)
2678
(38875)
9085
(149734)
3378
(238336)
2865
(260066)
2900
(259804)
5.99
(22.24)
0.48
(6.02)
5.35
(21.10)
0.39
(5.38)
Foreign Assets>0
(4)
33403
(214000)
11753
(80781)
39866
(311713)
14824
(499117)
12801
(549817)
12943
(549257)
7.16
(22.76)
0.49
(5.10)
6.33
(21.53)
0.53
(5.59)
0.93 0.94
(8.65) (7.69)
& 3 have 56,385 firm by industry
by year observations, while Col 2 & 4 have 12,385 observations. (2) Outcome variables are constructed from the BEA
Direct Foreign Investment Benchmark Surveys for 1966-1999. All outcome variables are in real thousands of 1982 USD
(deflated using U.S. industry PPI from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis FRED II) (4) Def of "High Income, OECD"
comes from the World Bank.
=
Table 1.3: Regression Results, Real Foreign Assets as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm by Industry Regulation (Regfit) 735.3 735.3 319.9 329.9 329.9
(130.6) (130.9) (103.1) (131.9) (131.7)
Mean Elasticity 2.0 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x
Firm by Year x x
Industry by Year x x x
Number of Plants x
Number of Plants Squared x
Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a
firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed
using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted.
Table 1.4: Regression Results, Other Outcome Variables
Plant & Exp on Sales, U.S.
Property Goods & Gross Parent
Exp Services Product Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales,
U.S.
(5)
Firm by Industry Regulation (Regit) 125.9 702.1 290.9 131.4 99.7
(44.6) (196.0) (138.6) (130.0) (134.1)
Mean Elasticity 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.6 0.8
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x x x
Firm by Year x x x x x
Industry by Year x x x x x
Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a
firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed
using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted.
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Table 1.5: Other Outcome Variables, Excl High Income, OECD Nations
Foreign Plant & Exp on Goods Gross Sales, U.S. Sales,
Assets Property Exp & Services Product Parent Firm U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm by Industry Regulation (Regf,,) 59.5 29.3 102.0 47.4 51.6 23.6
(38.3) (14.0) (54.9) (111.9) (122.3) (122.5)
Mean Elasticty 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.8 0.8
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x x x x
Firm by Year x x x x x x
Industry by Year x x x x x x
Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a firm in an
industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed using two way effects
model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted.
T -- -- - - -- - -- -
Table 1.6: Regulation Effects on the Ratio of Production in Developing Countries to Total
Foreign Production
Foreign
Assets
[4.37]
(1)
Plant &
Property
Exp
[5.23]
(2)
Exp on
Goods &
Services
[4.40]
(3)
Gross
Product
[4.50]
(4)
Sales, U.S.
Parent Firm
[2.51]
(5)
Sales,
U.S.
[2.21]
(6)
Firm by Industry Regulation (Regfit) 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.054 -0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.061) (0.015) (0.427) (0.006) (0.006)
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x x x x
Firm by Year x x x x x x
Industry by Year x x x x x x
Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a
firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed
using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted.
Table 1.7: The Effect of Pollutant Specific Regulatory Programs on Foreign Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm by Industry Regulation: COfit 514.8 514.9
(319.2) (340.6)
Firm by Industry Regulation: Ofit 275.4 267.7
(129.6) (132.7)
Firm by Industry Regulation: SOft -139.6 -242.7
(336.9) (352.4)
Firm by Industry Regulation: TSPfit -64.1 -191.0
(233.6) (251.7)
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x x x
Firm by Year x x x x x
Industry by Year x x x x x
Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a
firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed
using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted.
Table 1.8: Interacted With Lagged Import Penetration
Exp on Goods
Foreign Assets & Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm by Industry Reg
Regfi,, *IMPEN
ulation (Regfit) 124.0 -69.1 422.7 28.8
(154.0) (165.5) (230.0) (247.2)
86.0 116.8
(32.6) (48.7)
Sales, U.S. Parent
Firm
(5)
156.4
(152.7)
156.4
(152.7)
(6)
89.9
(164.1)
Regfit *IMPENi(Above Median) 692.2
(171.6)
1167.9
(256.3)
72.3
(170.2)
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x x
Firm by Year x x x x
Industry by Year x x x x
'Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a
firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed using
two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted. (3) "IMPEN" stands for the
averaged import penetration.
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Appendix Table 1.AI: Regression Results, Real Foreign Assets as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm by Industry Regulation (Regfit) 859.6 858.5 374.9 218.4 207.3
(199.0) (199.4) (160.6) (129.5) (129.5)
Mean Elasticity 2.3 2.3 1.0 0.6 0.6
Industry at Home, By Year x x x x x
Nonattainment, By Year x x x x x
Firm by Industry x x x
Firm by Year x x
Industry by Year x x x
Number of Plants x
Number of Plants Squared x
Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the real foreign assets
of a firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions
computed using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted.
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Chapter 2
Monitoring Works: Getting
Teachers to Come to School
Summary 2 In the rural areas of developing countries, teacher absence is a widespread prob-
lem. This paper tests a simple incentive program based on teacher presence can reduce teacher
absence, and whether this has the potential to lead to more teaching activities and better learn-
ing. In 60 one-teacher informal schools in rural India, randomly chosen out of 120, a financial
incentive program was initiated to reduce absenteeism. Teachers were given a camera that had a
temper-proof date and time function, along with instructions to have one of the children photo-
graph the teacher and other students at the beginning and end of the school day. The time and
date stamps on the photographs were used to track teacher attendance. A teacher's salary was
a direct function of his attendance. The introduction of the program resulted in an immediate
decline in teacher absence. The absence rate changed from an average of 42% in the compar-
ison schools to 22% in the treatment schools. When the schools were open, teachers were as
likely to be teaching in both types of schools, and the number of students present was roughly
the same. The program positively affected child achievement levels: A year after the start of
the program, test scores in program schools were 0.17 standard deviations higher than in the
comparison schools and children were more likely to be admitted into regular schools.
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2.1 Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals call for achieving universal primary education by 2015. In
response, many developing countries, including India, have rapidly improved access to primary
schooling. However, these improvements are often not matched by improvements in school
quality. As a result, while more children start primary school, many leave after just a few
years, having learned very little in the process. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, India, half of
the students enrolled in primary school could not even read a simple sentence (Banerjee et al.
2005). Such poor learning outcomes may be an artifact of high absence among teachers. Using
unannounced visits to measure teacher attendance, a nationally representative survey found
that 24 percent of teachers in India were absent from the classroom during normal school hours
(Chaudhury, et al., 2005a,b). The situation in India is particularly bleak where, in terms of
absence rates, India ranked seventh among the eight countries for which comparable data was
collected. Getting teachers to attend school may help India achieve the improvements in school
quality needed to make "universal primary education" a meaningful term.
It has been argued that teachers, the agents, fail to attend school because neither the prin-
cipal nor the beneficiary has the capacity to both effectively monitor and penalize absence. The
principals, usually governments, but increasingly NGOs, have the power to penalize absences,
but, being far removed, may not be able to effectively monitor attendance. As such, they often
lack the information needed to enforce attendance rules. The community, being proximal, can
effectively monitor attendance, but it often lacks the power to penalize absence. One solution-
championed by many, including the 2004 World Development Report-is to expand community
control by improving community-based monitoring; strengthening the flow of information be-
tween the community and the principal; involving the community in decisions to hire, fire, and
pay teachers; or transferring wholesome control of teachers to the community.
However, evidence from a variety of contexts suggests that community control interven-
tions have not been effective at reducing absence. Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004) found
that community-based monitoring, even when robustly structured, did not reduce absenteeism
among service providers at government health facilities in rural India. Information sharing and
auxiliary rewards for teachers fare no better. Kremer and Vermeersch (2005) found no effect for
a program in rural Kenya that empowered school committees to monitor teachers, share per-
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formance information with officers in the Ministry of Education, and to give substantial prizes
to the best-performing teachers. Having closer ties to the community, which may entail high
community pressure, also had no effect on absence. Chaudhury et al (2005b) found that locally
hired teachers; teachers in schools with a Parents-Teachers' Association; teachers with longer
local tenure; and contract teachers and teachers at non-formal schools run by NGOs (who,
in addition, faced a greater risk of dismissal)-all had absence rates significantly higher than
those of government school teachers. Finally, Olken (2004) found that increasing community
participation in meetings where public officials accounted for expenditure of public funds does
not reduce corruption in local development projects in Indonesia.
In contrast, external control, because it often comes with a clear and credible threat of
punishment, may be more effective at inducing "good" behaviors. Contrary to his findings on
community participation, in the same study, Olken (2004) found that the threat of a top-down
audit resulted in a significant decline in corruption. The evidence suggests that external control
may similarly yield gains in teacher attendance. Chaudhury et al. (2005b) report that teachers
at schools that are inspected more tend to have lower absentee rates.
In this paper, we formally test whether direct monitoring, coupled with high-powered incen-
tives, results in higher quality schooling. In particular, we study a scheme aimed at reducing
truancy among teachers at NGO-run non-formal education centers (NFEs) in rural India. Seva
Mandir, the NGO running the NFEs, gave teachers cameras that had a temper-proof date
and time fimunction, along with instructions to have one of the students take a picture of the
teacher and the other students at the start and close of each school day. Using the detailed
attendance data from the cameras, Seva Mandir provided teachers with financial incentives to
attend class. We take advantage of Seva Mandir's program to try to answer three main ques-
tions: If teachers are given high-powered incentives to attend based on external monitoring,
will they attend school more? If teachers attend school more, will they teach more? Finally, if
teacher absenteeism is reduced, will children learn more as a result?
While previous teacher incentive programs have been successful in increasing child learning
levels on the surface, it is not necessarily clear if these gains are long lasting. In general,
incentives are open to the risk of multitasking, where the agent concentrates on the easiest way
to increase the rewarded measure with little or no gains in the measure the principal ultimately
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wants to improve (Holstrom and Milgrim, 1991). Most programs aimed at improving school
quality provide teachers with incentives based on their students' performance on standardized
exams. Lavy (2004) found that Israeli students performed better on the exams when their
teachers were given incentives based these exam scores, and Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003)
found similar results for a teacher-incentive scheme in Kenya. However, both programs may
have been subject to multitasking. Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) found that the gains in
learning were only temporary and were not accompanied by increases in teacher attendance
or effort. Teachers, they concluded, may have just gamed the system. That is, to obtain the
financial rewards, they had simply taught to the test, which is the rational thing to do given its
proven effectiveness at improving scores in the short run. Studies in the United States provide
further evidence of similar gaming behavior among educators facing high-powered incentives,
including altering what was served at lunch on the day of the test (Figlio and Winicki, 2002),
manipulating who takes the test (Figlio and Getzler, 2003), and outright cheating (Jacob and
Levitt, 2003).
This paper reports on the effectiveness of an alternative incentive scheme, where the teacher
is simply given an incentive to be present in school, thus avoiding the form of multitasking
faced by high-powered schemes predicated on student outcomes. In theory, this type of in-
centive scheme is already in place. Teachers are paid to come to work every day, and most
school systems, both private and public, have provision to penalize unexplained absences. In
developing countries, however, teachers are typically not punished (much less dismissed) for
poor attendance. A finding that this type of incentive system, if actually implemented, could
curb absence and improve learning outcomes would have important policy implications, since it
would suggest that rather than creating entirely new systems or elaborately remodeling existing
systems, simply enforcing the rules already in the books may be a good way to improve school
quality.
Although directly rewarding teacher attendance removes the incentive to manipulate mea-
sures of child learning outcomes, it may introduce other forms of multitasking that could negate
the gains in teacher attendance to the detriment of child learning. Several theories suggest that
providing financial incentives to attend may cause teachers to teach less even as they attend
school more. First, such schemes may demoralize teachers, resulting in less effort. In labora-
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tory experiments, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) found that individuals under high-powered incentive
may lose their motivation and so work less than under a flat wage regime. Second, financial
incentives may harm a teacher's intrinsic motivation, that is, the sense of duty, or enjoyment
of the job that motivates them to come to work (Kreps, 1997). This threat is particularly real
for teachers, who as a group have strong intrinsic motivation because of the value they place on
interacting with children and in seeing the children succeed (This can be said even of teachers
in developing countries, for the bulk of them do come to school and do teach, and do so under
what are often very difficult circumstances.) If given incentives based on presence, teachers
may come to believe that just attending class is enough; that their behavior in the classroom is
not important. Finally, some teachers, who had previously believed that they were required to
work everyday of a month, might decide to stop working once they have reached their target
income for the month (Fehr and Gotte, 2002). On the other hand, the main cost of working
for a teacher may be the opportunity cost of going to school, rather than carrying out other
activities (such as tending their field or working in another job for a day). Once they have come
to school, the marginal cost of actually teaching may be quite low. Under these circumstances
an incentive system that directly rewards presence would have the best chance of increasing
child learning, since the system will increase total teaching time, as opposed to just teacher
presence.
In this study, we examine the impact of Seva Mandir's teacher incentive program on teacher
presence, teaching activities, and child learning. Seva Mandir runs single-teacher non-formal
education centers (NFEs) in the tribal villages of Udaipur, Rajasthan. Udaipur is sparsely pop-
ulated hilly region. Villages are often remote and difficult to access, making regular monitoring
of the NFEs difficult. As a result, absence rates among teachers are high, despite the threat
of dismissal for repeated absence. Banerjee et al (2004) found an absence rate of 40 percent in
1995, and, for our baseline taken in 2003, we found an absence rate of 44 percent.
Faced with such high absenteeism, Seva Mandir implemented an innovative incentive pro-
gram in September 2003. In 60 randomly selected program schools, Seva Mandir gave teachers
a camera, along with instructions to have one of the students take a picture of the teacher and
the other students at the start and close of each school day (see Figure 1). The cameras had
temper-proof (late and time functions, allowing for the collection of accurate information on
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teacher attendance, which was then used to calculate teacher's salaries. Each teacher was paid
according to the number of "valid" school days for which they actually attended. A "valid" day
was defined as one for which the opening and closing photos were separated by at least 5 hours
and both photos showed a minimum number of children. In the 60 comparison schools, teachers
were paid a fixed rate for the month, and were told (as usual) that they could be dismissed for
repeated, unexcused absences.
The introduction of the program resulted in an immediate and long lasting improvement
in teacher attendance rates (as measured through one unannounced visit per month, in both
treatment and comparison schools). Over the 18 months of the program, teachers at program
schools had an absence rate of 22%, roughly half of the 44% baseline and the 42% at comparison
schools. Some 36% of program teachers had better than 90% presence compared to only 1
percent of comparison teachers. Extreme delinquency, over 50% absence, was eradicated in
program schools. That absence rates stayed low after the end of the (proper) evaluation phase
implies there was no Hawthorne Effect, namely, teachers did not change their behavior simply
for the experiment.
When school was open, teachers were as likely to be teaching in treatment as in comparison
schools, providing confirmation of our intuition that the marginal costs of teaching may be low
once the teacher attends class. However, because they had better attendance records than their
comparison school counterparts, teachers at treatment schools taught for the equivalent of 54
more children-days (or a third more) per month. Student attendance was the same in both
groups, but more teaching meant more learning for children in treatment schools. A year after
the start of the program, their test scores were 0.17 standard deviations higher than those of
children in comparison schools. The program impact and cost compares favorably with other
successful education programs in developing countries.
The NFEs present a particularly good venue to study teacher incentives. First, the In-
dian government is heavily relying on non-formal schooling to provide education to its most
vulnerable children, thus finding ways to improve the quality of these schools is particularly
important. Second, since both NGO-run and government schools have high absence rates, the
lessons drawn from could be applied, with some modification, to government schools, even if
the institutions at both types of schools somewhat differ.
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The findings clearly demonstrate both the link between simple, straightforward, well-enforced
incentives and teacher presence, and the link between teacher presence and student achieve-
ment. The program did not require elaborate reengineering of school institutions; it simply
provided the means to enforce existing rules and strengthen existing incentives. The impli-
cation for policy is that one way to rapidly achieve the much-needed improvements in school
quality may simply be to find ways of enforce the existing rules. In addition, the findings
suggest that external monitoring coupled with simple, direct incentives may also be used to
reduce absence among providers of other services essential to development, such as health, in
rural areas where the need is the greatest and absence is most prevalent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description
of the incentive program, and the evaluation techniques. The results are presented in Section
3. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Program and the Evaluation
2.2.1 Non-formal Education Centers
Non-formal education centers (NFEs) are an integral component of India's education system.
Since the National Policy on Education of 1986, they have played an increasingly important role
in India's drive towards universal primary education. The NFEs serve two main purposes. First,
since they are easier to establish and cheaper to run, they have been the primary instrument for
rapidly expanding access to schooling to children in poor, remote rural areas where there are
no government schools or where schools are far away. The government of Madhya Pradesh, for
example, mandated that NFEs be established for all communities where there were no schools
within in a kilometer. Second, the NFEs have been used to ease children, who may otherwise
not attend school, to join a government school at the age-appropriate grade level. In particular,
since NFEs are subject to fewer regulations than government schools, they can tailor their hours
and curricula to meet the diverse needs of the children. As of 1997, 21 million children were
enrolled in NFEs across India (EFA Assessment Country Reports, 2000).
Children of all ages may attend, though most were between 7-10 years in our sample. Nearly
all the children are illiterate when they first join the centers. In the setting of our project, the
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NFEs are open 6 hours a day and have 20 students, all taught in one classroom by one teacher,
who is recruited from the local community and has, on average, completed up to a 10th grade
education. Instruction focuses on teaching children basic Hindi and math skills.
2.2.2 The Program
Seva Mandir administers about 150 non-formal primary education centers (NFE) in the tribal
villages in Udaipur, Rajasthan. Udaipur is a sparsely populated, arid and hilly region, where
villages are remote and access is difficult. As a result, it is often difficult for Seva Mandir to
regularly monitor the NFEs. Absenteeism is high, despite the organization's policy calling for
dismissal of absentee teachers. A 1995 study (Banerjee et al, 2004) found that the absence rate
was 40%, while the baseline of this study (in August 2003) found that the rate was 44%.
Seva Mandir was, therefore, motivated to identify ways to reduce absenteeism among its
teachers. To this end, they implemented an innovative external monitoring program in Sep-
tember 2003. They chose 120 schools to participate in the study, with 60 randomly selected
schools for the program serving as the treatment group and the remaining 60 as the comparison
group. In the 60 treatment schools, Seva Mandir gave each teacher a camera, along with in-
structions for one of the students to take a photograph of the teacher and the other students at
the start and end of each school day. The cameras had a temper-proof date and time function,
which makes it possible to precisely track each school's openings and closings. As Figure 1
demonstrates, the day of the month and the time of the day appear in the right corner (the
month does not appear, but there is no ambiguity about that since the rolls are changed every
month). Camera upkeep (replacing batteries, changing and collecting film) was done monthly
at regularly scheduled teacher meetings. If a camera malfunctioned, teachers were instructed to
call the program hotline within 48 hours. Someone was then dispatched to replace the camera,
and teachers were credited for the day in which the camera was broken.
The monthly base salary for teachers was set at Rs1000 for 21 days of work in a month. In
the treatment schools, teachers received a Rs50 bonus for each additional day they attended
in excess of the 21 days. Similarly, they received a Rs50 fine for each day from the 21 days
they did not attend work. A "valid" day was defined as a day in which the opening and closing
photographs were separated by at least 5 hours and enough children (at least 8) were present in
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both photos to indicate that the school was actually functioning. Due to ethical and political
concerns, Seva Mandir capped the fine at Rs500; hence, a teacher's salary ranged from Rs 500
to Rs 1,300. In the 60 comparison schools, teachers were paid the flat rate of Rs 1,000, and
were told that they could be dismissed for poor attendance (though this happens very rarely,
and did not happen during the span of the evaluation).
Seva Mandir pays teachers every two months. In each two-month period, they collected
the last roll of film a few days before the salary payment, so that the bonus or the fine was
paid immediately after the end of the relevant time period. Moreover, after the first payment,
teachers in the treatment schools were shown a detailed breakdown of how their payment was
calculated, in order to reinforce the understanding of the program.
2.2.3 Evaluation
In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of Seva Mandir's incentive program in improving
school quality. To do so, an independent evaluation team led by Vidhya Bhawan (a Udaipur-
based consortium of schools and teacher training institutes) and the MIT's Poverty Action Lab
collected regular data on the functioning of the program. Data was collected to answer the
three basic questions: If teachers are with provided high-powered incentives to attend school
that are based on external monitoring, will they attend more often? If they do attend school
more, will teaching time increase? Finally, will children learn more as a result?
The Poverty Action Lab collected data on teacher attendance through one random unan-
nounced visit per month in both treatment and control schools. By comparing the absence rates
obtained from the random checks across the two types of schools, we can determine the incen-
tive program effect on absenteeism. In addition, Seva Mandir provided access to all the camera
and payment data for the treatment schools, allowing us to compare absence rates measured by
the random checks against those measured from the cameras. In addition to verifying whether
the random. checks provide a good estimate of actual attendance rates, this comparison also
allows us to verify whether teachers are simply coming to school in the mornings and afternoon
for the photos, rather than attending the entire school day.
Data collected on teacher and student activity at the time of the random unannounced visit
will allow us to determine if the teacher taught more as a result of the program. For schools
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that were open during the visit, the enumerator noted what the teachers and students were
doing: if the children were sitting in class, if anything was written on the blackboard, and if
the teacher talking to the children. Since the schools only have one teacher and one classroom,
these activities could be noted before the teacher and students adjusted their behavior.
Since teaching time is also a function of child attendance, student attendance data was
collected at the time of the random check. After completing the observation sheet, the enumer-
ator conducted a roll call to document which children on the evaluation roster were present.
Enumerators also noted whether any of the absent children had dropped out of school or had
enrolled in a government school, and then updated the evaluation roster to include new children.
To determine whether child learning increased as a result of the incentive program, in
collaboration with Seva Mandir, the evaluation team administered three basic competency
exams: a pre-test in August 2003, a mid-test in April 2004, and a post-test in September 2004.
The pre-test followed Seva Mandir's usual testing protocol: children were given either a written
exam (for those who could write) or an oral exam (for those who could not). For the mid-test
and post-test, all children were given the oral exam and an opportunity to try the written exam.
Those unable to write got a zero on the written section. The oral exam tested simple math
skills (counting, one-digit addition, simple division) and basic Hindi vocabulary skills, while the
written exam tested for these competencies plus more complex math skills (two-digit addition
and subtraction, multiplication and division), the ability to construct sentences, and reading
comprehension. Thus, the written exam tested both a child's ability to write and their ability
to handle material requiring higher levels of competencies relative to the oral exam.
Finally, detailed data were collected on teachers' characteristics to determine the extent
to which the program impact on child learning varied with teacher characteristics. First, to
determine whether the effect on learning depended upon a teacher's academic ability, Seva
Mandir administered a competency exam to each teacher prior to the program. Second, after
the program had been in place for two months, the evaluation team observed each school for
a whole day, in order to assess whether the impact of the program depended on the pedagogy
employed by the teachers.
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2.3 Results
In this section, we begin by reporting the results of the baseline survey and assessing the integrity
of the randomized framework (Section 3.1). Then, we discuss the impact of the program on
teacher attendance (Section 3.2), child attendance (Section 3.3) and child learning (Section 3.4).
Finally, in Section 3.5, we provide a benefit-cost analysis of the program.
2.3.1 Baseline and Experiment Integrity
Given that schools were randomly allocated to the treatment and control groups, we expect
the quality of schooling measures before the program onset to be similar across the groups.
Before the program was announced in August 2003, the evaluators were able to randomly visit
44 schools in the treatment group and 41 in the comparison. Panel A of Table 1 shows that
the attendance rates were 66% and 63%, respectively. The 2.5 percentage-point difference
is not significant. Other measures of school quality were also similar prior to the program:
on all dimensions shown in Table 2.1 (number of students present in school at the time of
visit, infrastructures, teacher qualification and performance), the treatment schools appear to
be slightly better than comparison schools, but the differences are always small and never
significant. The last row in the table shows the F-statistic for the joint significance of the
treatment variable in all the equations in Panel B through E. The F-statistic is 1.13, with a
p-value of .25, implying that the control and treatment schools were indistinguishable from one
another at the program inception.
Baseline academic achievement and preparedness were the same for students across the two
types of schools. Table 2.2 presents the results of the Pre-Test (administered in August 2003).
Panel A shows the percentage of children who could write. Panels B and C show the results
from the oral and written tests, respectively. On average, students in both groups were at the
same level of preparation before the program, though there seems to be greater dispersion in
the treatment schools. In the pre-test, 17% of children in the treatment schools and 19% in the
comparison schools took the written exam. The difference is not significant. Those who took
the oral exam were somewhat worst in treatment schools, and those who took the written exam
were somewhat better in treatment schools. Once again, the differences are not significant.
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2.3.2 Teacher Absence
The effect on teacher absence was both immediate and long lasting. Figure 2.2, shows the
fraction of schools found open on the day of the random visit, by month. Between August and
September, teacher attendance increased in treatment schools relative to the comparison. For
the remainder of the program, the attendance rates in treatment and comparison schools fol-
lowed similar seasonal fluctuations, with the treatment school attendance systematically above
the control school attendance.
As Figure 2.2 shows, the effect of the program remained strong even after the administration
of the post-test, which marked the end of the evaluation. Since the program had been so
effective, Seva Mandir wanted to expand it to the control schools, but only had enough resources
to keep the program running at the 60 treatment schools. Random checks conducted after
the post-test show that higher attendance rates persisted at treatment schools even after the
teachers knew that the experiment was over and that the program was now permanent. This
implies that teachers had not change their behavior simply for the experiment. In other words,
there is no evidence that the program had a Hawthorne effect.
Table 2.3 presents a detailed breakdown of the effect of the program on absentee rates.
Columns 1 and 2 report the means for the treatment and comparison schools, respectively,
over the entire period for which random checks were conducted (September 2003 to March
2005). Column 3 presents the difference between the treatment and comparison schools for this
entire period, while Columns 4 through 6 presents the difference for three time periods: up till
the mid-test, between the mid-test and post-test, and after the post-test. On average, teacher
absence was 20 percentage points lower in the treatment schools than in the comparison schools.
Thus, the program halved absence rates in treatment schools. The treatment effect was smaller
for the period between the mid-test and post-test, largely because comparison school teachers
attended class more often, and then rose to 26 percentage point after the post-test.
The program effects on attendance were pervasive-teacher attendance increased in all
treatment schools. Figure 3A plots the observed density of absence rates in treatment and
comparison schools for the 20 random checks conducted during the program, while Figure 3B
graphs the estimated cumulative density function of the frequency of attendance if the distrib-
ution of absence followed a beta-binomial distribution. The actual and estimated distributions
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are very similar, indicating that the assumption of a binomial distribution is quite accurate.
Both figures clearly show that the incentive program shifted the entire distribution of absence
for treatment teachers. Of the 20 days, not one of 60 teachers in the comparison schools is
present on all days and only one is present for 19. Almost 15% of teachers are absent more
than half the times. One other hand, 6 of the 60 program teachers were always present, 6 are
present on 19 of the 20 days, and all the teachers were present at least half the time. Therefore,
the camera program was effective on two margins: it eliminated extremely delinquent behavior
(less than 50 percent presence), and increased the number of teachers with perfect or very high
attendance records.
Teachers did not try to game the system. The fact that treatment teachers have a lower
absence rate in the random checks, which were conducted in the middle of the day, suggests
that teachers did not attend class at the start and end of the day to sit for the photographs,
and then leave in the intervening period. A comparison of the random check data and the
camera data provides proof of this. Table 2.4 shows that for the treatment schools, the camera
data tends to match the random check data quite closely. Out of the 976 cases, 82 percent had
perfectly matching random check and camera data, that is, the school was open and the photos
were valid or the school was closed and the photos not valid. There are 43 cases, however,
where school was closed and the photos were valid, but only 19 of these are due to teachers
leaving in the middle of the day. Attempts to game the system declined over time. During the
last 5 months of the program, there were no cases where teachers left in the middle of the day.
Of the 131 cases (15%) where the school was open but the photos were invalid, it was primarily
because there was only one photo (37%) or because the school was open for less than the full
five hours (29%). This suggests that for a small number of cases, the random check may assign
a comparison school as open for the day, even though it is open for only part of the school day.
Therefore, since the program may affect both the number of days and length of each school
day, the random check data may, if anything, underestimate the effect of the program on total
teaching time a child receives. Figure 2.4 reinforces this belief. It plots the difference in average
teacher attendance for treatment and comparison schools, by the time of the random check.
The figure illustrates that the difference in the attendance rate increases through out the day,
suggesting that teachers in treatment schools not only attended more often, but also kept the
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schools open for more hours.
2.3.3 Teacher Behavior
Though the program increased teacher attendance and the length of the school day, the program
could still be ineffective if the teachers compensated for increased presence by teaching less.
We looked at activity data collected at the time of the random check to determine what the
teachers were doing while present in the classroom. It is important to note that since we can
only measure the impact of the program on teacher performance for schools that are open, the
fact that treatment schools are open more may introduce selection bias. That is, if teachers
who tend to be absent also tend to teach less when present, the treatment effect may be biased
downward since more observations would be drawn from among such low-effort teachers in
treatment group than in comparison. Table 2.5 shows that there was no significant difference
in the activities of teachers in program and comparison schools during the random visit. In the
comparison schools as in the treatment schools, teachers were as likely to be in the classroom,
to have used the blackboard, and to be addressing students when the enumerator arrived. This
does not appear to have changed during the duration of the program (Appendix Figure 1).
The fact that, as opposed to just showing up to class more, teachers actually taught more
can perhaps be linked to the teacher's acceptance of the incentive system. Several months into
the program, teachers were asked to fill feedback forms, and Seva Mandir discussed with them
their impressions at their bi-annual training session. Although some teachers complained about
the inflexibility of the rules, many felt empowered by the fact that the onus of performing better
was actually in their hands: "Our payments have increased, so my interest in running the center
has gone up."
2.3.4 Child Attendance
Conditional on the school being open, the effect of the program on child attendance cannot be
directly estimated because of selection bias. If schools that are typically open also attract more
children and the program induces the "worst" school (with fewer children attending regularly)
to be open more often in the treatment schools than in the comparison schools, then the
selection bias will tend to bias the effect of the program on children attendance downwards. In
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fact, selection bias is a realistic concern since, for the comparison schools, there is a positive
correlation between fraction of times a school is found open and the number of children found
in school.
Even so, child attendance is higher in treatment schools, but the difference is insignificant.
In Table 2.6, we present the attendance rates of a child in an open school, by treatment sta-
tus. While an average child's attendance is slightly higher in treatment schools (51%) than in
comparison schools (49%), this difference is not significant. Excluding children who left the
NFE, child attendance is higher overall (64% for the treatment and 61% for the control), but
the difference is also insignificant.
Treatment schools have more teaching days. Even if the program does not increase child
attendance on a particular day, the increase in the number of days the school is open should
result in more days of teaching per child. The impact of program on child instruction time is
reported in Rows 3 and 4 of Table 2.6. Taking into account days in which the schools are closed,
a child in a treatment school received 10 percentage points (or 30%) more days of instruction
than a child in a control school. Assuming 27 days of work in a month (schools are open 6 days
a week), a child obtains 2.7 more days of instruction time a month at treatment schools. Since
there are roughly 20 children per classroom, this figure translates into 54 more children-days of
instruction per month in program schools than in comparison schools.
In summary, since the children are as likely to attend class on a given day in treatment
as comparison schools, they receive more days of instruction in the treatment schools. This
suggests that for teachers who were not present, their absence was not likely to be the efficient
response to a lack of interest by the children.
2.3.5 Effects on Learning
Children in treatment schools got on average 30% more instruction time than children in com-
parison schools. Over the course of a year, this results in 34 more days of instruction per child.
Did this result in an increase in test scores?
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Attrition and Means of Mid- and Post-Test
Before comparing test scores in the treatment and control schools, we must first ensure that
selective attrition does not invalidate the comparison. There are three possible sources of
attrition. First, a few centers closed down at the program start. These closures were unrelated
to the program, and equally distributed among treatment and comparison schools. We made no
attempt to track the children from these centers. Second, some children leave the NFE, either
because they drop out of school altogether or because they start attending regular primary
schools. Finally, some children were absent on testing days. To minimize the impact of attrition
on the study, we made considerable attempts to track down children who did not show for
the last two tests (even if they had left the NFE) and administered the post-test to them.
Consequently, attrition was low. Of the 2230 students who took the Pre-test, 1893 also took
the Mid-test, and 1760 also took the Post-test. Table 7 shows the attrition in the treatment
and comparison groups as well as the characteristics of the attriters. At the Mid-test, attrition
was higher in the control group than in the treatment group. At the Post-test, attrition was
similar in the treatment and comparison groups, and children who attrited from the treatment
group were similar to children who attrited from the comparison group.
Table 2.7 also provides some simple descriptive statistics, comparing the test scores of
treatment and control children. The first row presents the percentage of kids who were able
to take the written exam, while subsequent rows provide the mean exam score (normalized by
the mid-test control). Relative to the pre-test and mid-test, many more children, in both the
treatment and control schools, were able to write by the post-test. In the post-test students
did slightly worse in math relative to the mid-test comparison, they performed much better in
language.
Test Results
In Table 2.8, we report the impact of the program on the mid-test (conducted in April) and
the post-test (conducted in October). We compare the average test scores of students in the
treatment and control schools, conditional on a child's pre-program competency and prepared-
ness level. In a regression framework, we model the effect of being in a school j that is being
treated (Treatj) on child i's test score (Scoreikj) in test k (where k denotes either the Mid- or
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Post-test exam):
Scoreikj =-: 1 + - 2Treatj + / 3 Pre_Writij + /40ral_Scoreij + 35Written_Scoreij + Eijk (1)
Because test scores are highly autocorrelated, controlling for a child's test scores before the
program increases the precision of our estimate. However, the specific structure of the pre-test,
in particular, the fact that children either took the verbal or the oral test, does not allow for
a traditional difference-in-difference (DD) strategy. Instead of a DD approach, we include a
variable containing the child's pre-test score for the oral test if he took the oral Pre-test and 0
otherwise (Oral_Scoreij), the child Pre-test score at the written test if he took the written test
and 0 otherwise (Written Scoreij), and an indicator variable for whether he took the written
test at the P're-test (Pre_Writij). Standard errors are clustered by school. Each cell in Table 8
represents the treatment effect ( 2) obtained in a separate regression. For ease of interpretation,
the mid-test results (Columns 1 to 4) and post-test results (Columns 5 to 8) are expressed in
the standard deviation of the distribution of the mid-test score in the comparison schools.
The tables reveal that the program had a significant impact on learning, even as early as
the Mid-test. Children in treatment schools gained 0.16 standard deviations of the test score
distribution in language, 0.15 standard deviations in math, and 0.17 overall (Panel A). Children
with higher initial test scores gained the most from the program: those able to write at the
pre-test have mid-test test scores 0.25 standard deviation higher in treatment schools than in
comparison schools (Panel C). Children whose scores were below the median scores on the
Pre-test show no significant gains in test scores (Panel D).
The differences between students in the treatment and control schools persisted in the
post-test (Columns 5 to 8). Children in treatment schools gained 0.21 standard deviations in
language, 0.16 in math, and 0.17 overall (Panel A). Similar to the Mid-test, much of the gains
came from children with the higher initial learning levels. The treatment effect of 0.17 standard
deviations compares favorably other successful educational interventions, such as the Tennessee
Star experiment in the United States (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001) and Balsakhi Remedial
Education Program in India during its first years (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo and Linden, 2004).
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Given the prevalence of gender bias in rural India, there was a fear that teachers might
unfairly use their additional time by working more with the boys. Therefore, we compare the
impact of the program on girls versus boys in Table 2.9. As in Table 8, we continue to control
for the pre-test scores. The first two rows of Panel A list the individual treatment effect for
girls and boys, respectively, while the third row reports the difference in their treatment effects.
The data shows that the fear of gender bias was unfounded; if anything, girls gained more from
the program than boys. In the mid-test, 7 percentage-points more of girls in the treatment
school were able to write relative to the control, compared to only 2 percentage-points of boys
(this 5-percentage point difference is significant). The post-test also suggests that girls gained
slightly more from the program than the boys, but these differences are not significant.
Leaving the NFE
NFEs prepare children, who might not otherwise attend school, to join government schools at
the age-appropriate grade level. To join the government school, children must demonstrate
proficiency for a grade, either through passing an exam or through vetting by a government
teacher. The program increased the number of children graduating to the government schools.
As shown in Table 2.10, some 14 percent of students in the treatment schools graduated to the
government schools, compared to only 10 percent the comparison schools.
In the final row of Table 2.10, we present the dropout rates for children who left school
entirely (i.e. left the NFE and did not join a government school). The dropout rate is slightly
smaller for the treatment schools, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the difference be-
tween treatment and comparison schools is zero.
Teacher Presence on Learning
The previous sections presented the reduced form analysis of the effect of the incentives program
on child learning. Table 2.11 interprets what these estimates can tell us about the impact of
teacher presence. Columns 1 to 3 report simple correlations between teacher presence and test
scores. Specifically, they report the coefficient estimate of the fraction of times a school was
found open (Openj) on a regression of the mid-test or post-test scores:
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Scoreikj = 1 + 20penj + / 3 Pre_Writij + / 4 0ral_Scoreij + /35Written_Scoreij + Eijk (2)
As in the previous tables, we continue to control for the child's pre-test score and to cluster
standard errors by school.
Column 1, reports OLS estimation of Equation 2 for control schools, in order to obtain the
correlation between presence and child achievement levels. In this case, the random check data
is used to estimate the fraction of times a school is found open. The results indicate that the
test scores of children in centers open 100% of the time would be 0.20 standard deviation higher
than those of children in a center open 50% of the time.
This point estimate is similar those reported in other studies (Chaudhury, et al, 2005)
and suggest that the effect of teacher attendance on learning is not that large. Chaudhury et al
(2005) explain that the measurement of absence rates based on a few random visits per school
have considerable error, and may thus bias the results downwards. Consistent with this theory,
the effect on test scores (0.58) becomes larger in the post-test, where having more months of
random check data allows us to better estimate the absence rate per school. Our study provides
for a much more direct test of this hypothesis, since, for treatment teachers, the photograph
data gives us the actual attendance. We present the OLS estimate of the effect of presence
for treatment teachers using the random check data (Column 2) and camera data (Column
3). Overall, the effect of teacher presence is larger in the treatment schools than the control.
Consistent with the measurement error hypothesis, the effect of teacher presence is larger and
much more significant when using the more accurate measure of presence, especially in the
mid-test scores (the estimate is 0.87 standard deviations in the Column 3, compared to 0.39 in
Column 1). For the post-test, where we have a much more accurate measure of presence from
the random check data, the results from the two methods are more similar.
Finally, in Column 4, we pool both samples and instrument Openj (as measured by the
random check) by the treatment status of the school to obtain exogenous variation in the
percentage of time the school was found open in the random check. Since we have shown the
program has a direct effect on the length of the school day as well as the school opening, the
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2SLS estimate captures the joint effect of outright absence and of a longer school day. The 2SLS
estimates are higher than the OLS results found in Column 1, and they are undistinguishable
from the results in Column 3. This suggests that the relatively low correlation between teacher
absence and test score that was observed in previous studies may be due to measurement error
in the teacher absence data, and that reducing absence would have the potential to greatly
increase test score.
Teacher and Child Characteristics
In Table 2.12, we examine whether the treatment effect varies based on teacher and student
characteristics. Each cell in Table 12 reports the coefficient estimate (4) of the interaction of
being in a treated school and a school's characteristic (Charj) on a regression of the test score:
Scoreikj = i3 + 2Treatj + 3Charj + 4Treatij * Charj + 35Xij + Eijk (1)
Xij includes controls for pre-test scores and controls for the interaction of the pre-test scores
with the school characteristic. In Columns 1 and 2, we interact the treatment effect with a
teacher's academic abilities at the start of the program; the treatment effect is slightly larger for
teachers with higher test scores and for teachers with more years of schooling, but this effect is
small and not always significant. The treatment effect does not vary based on the infrastructure
level of the school (Column 3), and does not vary much based on teacher pedagogy (Columns
4 and 5) or student behaviors (Columns 6 and 7) at the time of the school observations in
October 2003. This suggests that regardless of the level of school infrastructure or teaching
competencies, initiating the incentive program can result in positive gains to learning.
Costs Benefit Analysis
The evaluation presented in this paper shows that a straightforward monitoring and incen-
tive program can effectively reduce teacher truancy. The benefits (in terms of child learning)
of running such a program, relative to costs, are high, and comparable to other successful
education programs in developing countries.
Table 2.13 presents an estimate of the cost of running the program for one year. For the
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treatment schools, the average teacher salary was nearly Rs 1,000. Since the flat salary paid
to comparison teachers was also 1000 rupees, the program did not increase expenditures on
teacher salaries. Other program costs (administration, developing the pictures, and buying
the cameras) amount to 5379 rupees per center per year. This cost corresponds to 40% of a
teacher's yearly salary, but to only Rs 268 ($6) per child per year (assuming about 20 children
per teacher).
The incentive program is a particularly cost-effective method to increase learning in rural
schools, where the costs of external monitoring are high. Overall, it is not necessarily cheaper
than other types of education programs evaluated in India. For example, its cost per standard
deviation improvement in test scores is higher than the Balsakhi Remedial Education program
evaluated in Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and Linden (2004). In the Balsakhi program, a second
teacher (often a woman) was hired to provide remedial tutoring to children who had been
identified as lagging behind their peers. The Seva Mandir program resulted in a 0.17 stan-
dard deviation in learning for Rs268 per child, while the Balsakhi program resulted in a 0.14
increase for Rs 107 during its first year. However, the Balsakhi program was evaluated in an
urban setting, the cities of Mumbai and Vadodara, where the external monitoring of teachers
is cheaper. Banerjee, Kremer, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2004) evaluated a program similar to
the Balsakl-hi program in the rural NFEs in Udaipur, Rajasthan. This program also hired an
additional teacher for each school, but, unlike the Balsakhi program, the second teacher was
not hired specifically to work with at-risk children. In this case, the original teachers skipped
class when the second teacher was present, and, therefore, the total teaching time that a child
was exposed to did not increase. Not surprising, the program had no effect on child learning.
Thus, while the Balsakhi program is relatively cheaper, implementing it in rural areas requires
a monitoring system to maintain its effectiveness, which would increase its cost in rural areas.
The cost of the Seva Mandir program is comparable to education programs in rural Africa,
but, unlike those, it is more likely to have longer lasting effects on child learning. The cost
per 0.10 standard deviations of the incentive program ($3.58) is roughly the same cost as the
test-based teachers incentive program ($3.53) that was evaluated in Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer
(2003) and a girl's scholarship program ($3.41) that was evaluated in Kremer, Miguel and
Thornton (2004). However, the gains of the test-based incentive programs on test scores were
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considered to be temporary. This was most likely due to the fact that teachers focused on
manipulations that led to short-term gains in test scores, which are not conducive to long-term
learning. Since test score were not the basis of teacher rewards in the Seva Mandir program, it
is likely that they reflect a genuine increase in learning levels. This belief is reinforced by the
results that more children "graduated" to formal schools in the treatment NFEs relative to the
comparison.
2.4 Conclusion
Addressing the startlingly high rates of teacher absenteeism in developing counties is important
for increasing school quality. The failure of school systems to carry out their own rules regarding
teachers presence have led some to believe that only community pressure could increase school
quality. In particular, this is the view of expressed in the 2004 World Development Report.
However, several recent studies have shown that, for a variety of reasons, relying on community
monitoring often results in disappointments.
In this paper, we show that in contrast to community monitoring, external monitoring
can be a cost-effective method to improve school quality. In particular, we show that the
direct monitoring of teachers, combined with a simple and credible incentives based on teacher
presence can lead to a large increase in teacher attendance, even if implemented in a difficult
environment. The program cut teacher absentee rates by half, from an average of 42 percent
in the control schools to 22 percent in the treatment schools. Students in program schools
benefited from about 30% more instruction time. Moreover, the program had a significant
statistical and economical impact on test scores. After a year, child test scores in program
schools were 0.17 standard deviations higher than in comparison schools, and children were
more likely to be admitted to regular primary schools. Despite being implemented on a small
scale, the program is cost effective.
Our findings show that external monitoring systems can succeed in reducing absenteeism in
situations where internal systems have failed. Often times, monitoring systems have failed as
individuals within the institution choose to ignore their own rules. For example, top-down mon-
itoring systems have been shown to fail when the headmasters were in charge of implementing
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them (Kremer and Chen, 2001), because the headmasters marked the teachers present even if
they were absent. In contrast, mechanical systems, such as the cameras, have the advantage of
not being subject to the discretion of any one individual: a commitment at a senior level would
make its implementation viable.
There is no doubt that extending Seva Mandir's incentive program to other non-formal
schools has the potential to increase learning levels for India's most vulnerable children. How-
ever, the one question that remains is whether it is politically feasible to implement an effective
monitoring system in government schools. Since teachers in government schools are much more
politically powerful than NFE teachers, it may prove impossible to institute a system where
they would be monitored daily using a camera or another device such as a date-time stamp,
and other methods may prove necessary (such as having more frequent inspections). However,
these results can tell us whether tackling the absence problem, by finding ways to monitor and
reward presence, can in principle be effective in reducing absence and improving learning.
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Figure 2.1: Photographs from Program
Table 2.1: Is School Quality Similar in Treatment and Control Groups Prior to Program?
Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3)
A. Teacher Attendance
Percent of Schools Open 0.66
44
B. Student Participation (Random Check)
Number of Students Present 17.72
29
0.63
41
0.02
(0.10)
85
15.54
26
2.19
(2.23)
55
Teacher Test Scores
C. Teacher Qualifications
34.99
53
Teacher Highest Grade Completed 10.21
57
33.62
56
9.80
54
D. Teacher Performance Measures (Random Check)
Ratio of Children Within Classroom to Outside of 0.85 0.84
Classroom
29 26
1.37
(2.01)
56
0.41
(0.46)
111
0.01
(0.09)
55
Percent of Teachers Interacting with Students
Blackboards Utilized
Infrastructure Index
E. School Infrastructure
3.39
57
Fstat(1,115)
Notes: (1) Teacher Performance Measures from Random Checks only include schools that were
open during the random check. (2) Infrastructure Index: 1-5 points, with one point given if the
following school attribute is sufficient: Space for Children to Play, Physical Space for Children
in Room, Lighting, Library, Floor Mats
0.79
29
0.86
0.73
26
0.85
26
0.06
(0.12)
55
0.01
(0.11)
4822
3.20
55
0.19
(0.30)
112
1.32
Table 2.2: Are Students Similar Prior To Program?
Levels
Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Took Written Exam
Normalized by Control
Treatment Control Difference
(4) (5) (6)
A. Can the Child Write?
0.17 0.19 -0.02
(0.04)
1136 1094 2230
B. Took Oral Exam
Math Score on Oral Exam 7.82
940
Language Score on Oral Exam 3.63
940
8.12 -0.30
(0.27)
888 1828
3.74 -0.10
(0.30)
888 1828
-0.10 0.00 -0.10
(0.09)
940 888 1828
-0.03 0.00 -0.03
(0.08)
940 888 1828
Total Score on Oral Exam
Math Score on Written Exam
11.44 11.95 -0.51
(0.48)
940 888 1828
C. Took Written Exam
8.62 7.98 0.64
(0.51)
196 206 402
-0.08 0.00 -0.08
(0.07)
940 888 1828
0.23
196
0.00 0.23
(0.18)
206 402
Language Score on Written Exam 3.62
196
3.44
206
0.18
(0.46)
402
0.08
196
0.00 0.08
(0.20)
206 402
Total Score on Written Exam
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered
exam.
12.17 11.41 0.76
(0.90)
196 206 402
by school. (2) Sample includes
0.16
196
0.00 0.16
(0.19)
206 402
every student present at pre-test
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0.26
(0.05)***
(5)
0.14
(0.04)***
Difference Between Treatment and Control Schools
Until Mid-Test Mid to Post Test After Post Test
(4)
0.2
(0.04)***
Table 2.3: Teacher Attendance
Sept 2003-March 2005
Treatment Control Diff
(1) (2) (3)
School is open 0.78 0.58 0.2
(0.04)***
1103 1086 2189
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered by school.
Figure 3A: Number of Schools Found Open
(out of20 visits)
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Table 2.4: Comparing Random Checks to Photo Data for Treatment Schools
Scenario Number Percent of Total
A. Possible Scenarios
School Open and Valid Photos 673 69%
School Open and Invalid Photos 131 13%
School Closed and Valid Photos 43 4%
School Closed and Invalid Photos 129 13%
B. Out of 131 where School is Open, the photos are invalid because....
School not open for full 5 hours 31 24%
Only one photo 44 34%
Not enough Children 28 21%
Instructor not in Photo 8 6%
No photograph 20 15%
C. Out of43 where School is Closed and the photos are valid.....
Random check completed after the school closed 4 9%
Teacher left in the middle of the day 19 44%
Random Check Time Missing 17 40%
Photo Data Missing 3 7%
Figure 4: Difference in the Percent of Open Schools Between Treatment
and Control, By Hour
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Table 2.8: Estimation of Treatment Effects for the Mid- and Post-Test
Mid-Test Post-Test
Took Took
Written Math Lang Total Written Math Lang Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. All Children
0.04 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.16 0.17
(0.03) (0.07)** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.04) (0.12)* (0.08)* (0.09)**
1893 1893 1893 1893 1760 1760 1760 1760
B. Took Pre-Test Oral
0.14 0.13 0.15 0.2 0.13 0.16
(0.08)* (0.06)** (0.07)** (0.14) (0.09) (0.10)
1550 1550 1550 1454 1454 1454
C. Took Pre-Test Written
0.19 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.25
(0.12) (0.11)** (0.11)** (0.18) (0.11)** (0.12)**
343 343 343 306 306 306
D. Below Median Rank on Pre-Test
0.06 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.05
(0.07) (0.06)* (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11)
958 958 958 897 897 897
E. Above Median Rank on Pre-Test
0.23 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.28
(0.09)*** (0.08)** (0.08)*** (0.12)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)***
935 935 935 863 863 863
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered by school. (2) Mid and Post Test Scores normalized by Mid Test
Control Group.
Table 2.9: Treatment Effects for the Mid- and Post-Test, by Gender
Mid-Test
Took Written Total Score
(1) (2)
Post-Test
Took Written Total Score
(3) (4)
Girls 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.18
(0.03)** (0.07)*** (0.05) (0.09)**
891 891 821 821
Boys 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.16
(0.04) (0.07)* (0.04) (0.10)
988 988 929 929
Interaction of Female 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03
and Treat (0.03)* (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
1879 1879 1750 1750
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered by school. (2) Mid and Post Test Scores
normalized by Mid Test Control Group.
Table 2.10: Dropouts and Movement into Government Schools
Treatment Control Diff
(1) (2) (3)
Child Left NFE 0.30 0.28 0.02
[0.04]
1136 1061 2197
Child Enrolled in Government School 0.14 0.10 0.04
[0.03]*
1136 1061 2197
Child Dropped Out of School 0.16 0.18 -0.02
[0.03]
1136 1061 2197
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the level of the school. (2) Dropouts are
defined as being absent for the last 5 random checks in which a school was found open.
_ _
Method:
Sample:
Data:
Took Written
Total Score
N
Table 2.11: Does the Random Check Predict Test Scores?
OLS OLS OLS
Control Schools Treatment Schools Treatment Schools
Random Check Random Check Photographs
(1) (2) (3)
A. Mid-test (Sept 03-April 04)
0.02 0.28 0.36
(0.10) (0.08)*** (.11)***
0.20
(0.19)
878
0.39
(0.21)**
1015
0.87
(.22)***
1015
2SLS
All Schools
Random Check
(4)
0.26
(0.19)
1.07
(0.43)**
1893
Took Written
Total Score
0.24
(0.16)
0.58
(0.35)*
B. Post-test (Sept 03 -Oct 04)
0.51 0.59
(0.15)*** (0.20)**
1.17 0.98
(0.36)*** (0.53)*
N 883 877 877 1760
0.33
(0.22)
0.97
(0.47)**
N 883 877 877 1760
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Table 2.13: Cost of Program Per Center over 12 Month Period
Item Cost
A. Camera Cost
Camera Cost' 1133
Film Cost 1392
Battery Cost 552
Photo Development and Printing: 1852
B. Salaries
Teacher Salaries 2 0
Labor Cost to Run Program3 450
Total Costs to Run Program 5379
Notes: (1) Assumes cameras last 3 years (2) Average Teacher Salary is
Rs 000 under program. In the absence of the program, it would be
Rsl000. (3) It takes approximately 50 man hours to process 115 schools
per month. Assume a staff worker being paid Rs 10,000 per month and
works a 40 hour week. Thus, it takes 1/2 hour of labor at Rs37.5 to
complete one center per month.
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Appendix 2.1A: Ratio of Students Inside the Classroom to Outside the Classroom
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Appendix Figure 2.1 B: Blackboards Used
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Chapter 3
The Labor Supply Response to
Childbirth Across Cultural Groups
in Israel
Summary 3 This paper estimates the labor supply effect of childbirth for Jewish and Muslim
women in Israel. As a source of exogenous variation in childbirth I use preferences over the
gender composition of children, which vary across the two cultural groups. While Israeli Arabs
prefer sons, Israeli Jews have a relative taste for symmetric families (at least one son and one
daughter). .Highly educated Arabs and Jews appear to prefer small families, but are significantly
more likely to have another child if they only have daughters. Using this exogenous variation
in fertility, I find that Jewish women work less as a result of having a third child. Arabs work
less as result of having a third child; however, this decrease is not significant at conventional
levels. When extending the analysis to look at the labor supply response to a fourth child, I
find that Jewish women are less likely to work with an additional child, whereas Muslim women
are more likely to be employed. However, religious institutions may not be fully responsible for
these differences in behavior. Instead, other socioeconomic characteristics may attribute to the
observed differences in the labor supply response across religious groups.
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3.1 Introduction
Social scientists have long been interested in the relationship between childbirth and a woman's
labor market decisions. This relationship may hold insights into social trends such as the gender
gap in earnings and education (Fuchs, 1989) and the rise of female labor supply in developed
nations (Coleman and Pencavel, 1993), as well as hold implications for public policy. For
example, if an unplanned birth has strong effects on a woman's employment choices (and, thus,
on family income), it may impact the education and development not only of the last child
but also of other children in the household. Therefore, the labor market effects of childbirth
should be taken into consideration when debating the availability of contraceptive technologies
or welfare for single mothers. Furthermore, this relationship has direct consequences for nations,
like Israel and Singapore, which have attempted to reverse slowdowns in population growth by
granting families financial incentives to have an additional child. In particular, it can help
answer the question of whether the financial bonus is sufficient to compensate families for the
loss in earnings that may result from an additional child.
In analyzing these trends and policy choices, one must carefully consider the role of social
and religious institutions on a woman's labor market response. As the institutions that define
the labor market opportunities of women and influence the perceived benefits and costs of
working outside the household may vary across different segments of society, there is no reason
to expect that all women will be similarly affected by childbirth. To illustrate, consider religious
differences in Israel. Since Islam places a strong emphasis on a bride's virginity, Muslim women
typically marry at an earlier age than non-Muslims. This consequently expands their fertile
years, and as such, Muslims typically have larger families than non-Muslim Israelis. A large
family may increase the demand for a woman's time within the household, causing employment
outside the home to be relatively unattractive. Islamic institutions may affect the work-family
tradeoff in a variety of other ways. For example, restrictions on the interactions between a
Muslim woman and men outside her family help define the rules of participation in the labor
force and the occupations that are deemed appropriate for 'proper' Muslim women. Given fewer
employment opportunities outside the home, one may expect that exiting the labor market upon
the birth of another child is less costly.
In this paper, I estimate the labor supply response to childbirth of women in Israel. Since
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socioeconomic factors may affect the magnitude of the response, I pay special attention to trends
in childbirth and labor market outcomes across cultural, income and educational groups. Due to
its mixture of diverse subcultures (Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, Ashkenazi Jews, Sephardic
Jews) and differences in income levels, Israel is a particularly interesting setting to further our
knowledge on how social institutions affect the family-work tradeoff.
Several studies have explored the impact of religious institutions on a woman's labor market
response to childbirth. The most relevant, for this paper, is Grossbard-Schechtman and Neuman
(2000). Using data on Jewish, Muslim Arab and Christian Arab women in Israel, they find
that having an additional child reduces the labor supply participation of all women, particularly
Muslim Arabs. Since the behavior of Christian Arabs resemble Jewish women more than Muslim
women, they conclude that differences in labor supply were due primarily to the differences
between the religious institutions-not between the Arab and Jewish culture. Interestingly,
these differences between Muslim and Jewish women faded at higher levels of education, perhaps
suggesting that they might be driven by socioeconomic factors (income and education levels)
rather than simply religion or culture.
While this, and other such studies, provides interesting correlations between work, religion,
and family size, they do not provide causal evidence on the labor supply response to childbirth.
Fertility and labor supply are jointly determined: we would expect women with strong prefer-
ences for work to reduce household responsibilities by having smaller families. To address this
reverse causation problem, a strand of literature has focused on finding exogenous sources of
variation in fertility. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) study twin births: since a twin birth ran-
domly assigns an extra child to a woman, the option of not having an additional child in order to
remain in the labor market is removed. They find that young American women with twins first
are less likely to participate in the formal labor market. Gangadharan and Rosenbloom (1996)
show that an unanticipated child due to twining causes a significant, but temporary reduction
in a woman's labor supply. An important implication of their work is that as earnings oppor-
tunities for women expanded in the 1980s, American women became less likely to reduce their
labor supply in response to childbirth. More recently, Vere (2005) exploited Chinese astrology
as an exogenous source of variation in childbirth: women in Hong Kong are more likely to have
a child in auspicious year. Vere finds that the effect of childbirth on labor supply decreases
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with a woman's education level, but is not strongly affected by her husband's earnings
The random assignment of gender provides another form of exogenous variation in fertility.
Ben-Porath and Welch (1976) show that parents care about the sex mix of their children:
parents with two children of the same gender are more likely to have a third child than parents
with children of different genders. Taking advantage of this cultural phenomenon, Angrist and
Evans (1998) compare the fertility choices of women who have been randomly assigned (by
nature) two children of the same gender with women who have a daughter and a son, and then
use these differences to quantify the labor supply response.
In this paper, I explore differences in gender bias for women of different cultural backgrounds
and education levels within Israel. I then exploit these differences to determine the effect of a
third or fourth child on a woman's labor supply response. An interesting story emerges: First,
while the evidence indicates that Israeli Arabs unambiguously prefer sons, Israeli Jews have a
relative taste for symmetric families (at least one son, and one daughter). Very educated Arabs
and Jews appear to prefer small families, but both groups are significantly more likely to have
another child if they only have daughters. Taking advantage of this exogenous variation in
fertility, I find that Jewish women work less as a result of having a third child. Both Muslim
and Christian Arabs also work less a result of having a third child, but this decrease is not
significant at conventional levels. When extending the analysis to look at the labor supply
response to a fourth child, I find that Jewish women are less likely to work, whereas Muslim
women increase their labor supply because of the additional child.
One possible explanation for these differences across religious group is income. Muslims
families are, on average, poorer than Jewish families. Therefore, it is possible that there is
a greater need for Muslim women with larger families to work in order to supplement their
family's incomes. To explore this effect, I disaggregate the data on Jewish women by income
levels to determine if lower income women react differently to childbirth than higher income
women.1 I find that most of the labor supply response to having another child comes from
women in the middle of the income distribution (the effect for poorest families, while negative,
is insignificant and the effect for the richest families is essentially zero). Although this analysis
does not provide causal evidence on the role of religion versus income, it does suggest that
'Unfortunately, the small sample size makes it impossible to do the same analysis for Muslim women.
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socio-economic factors may attribute to differences in the labor supply response across different
religious groups.
Section II describes the data and explores the patterns in gender preferences. I then present
the empirical estimates of the labor supply response to having a third child (Section III) and
the response to a fourth child (Section IV). Section V discusses how family income may affect
the labor supply response. Section VI concludes the paper.
3.2 Patterns of Childbirth and Data Description
This paper exploits differences in gender bias to estimate the causal link between childbirth
and work for women in Israel. In this section, I document gender bias within Israeli families,
paying special attention to differences in bias across cultural groups.
Several theories of gender bias persist in the literature. For example, the "Symmetry The-
ory" conjectures that couples have a taste for symmetrical families, and thus will continue to
have children until they have at least one daughter and one son. Among others, Ben-Porath and
Welch (1976), Rahman and DaVinzo (1993), and Angrist and Evans (1998) provide empirical
evidence supporting this theory. However, the most common belief regarding gender bias is
that couples prefer sons ("Son Preference"). This preference may be due to a variety of factors:
cultural beliefs that a male child proves the masculinity of the father, parents relying on male
children to support them in old age, etc. Countless papers have provided empirical support of
this perference across a wide range of countries (mostly from the developing world): Khan and
Sirageldin (1977), Rahman and DaVanzo (1993), Hollander (1996), Obermeyer and Cardenas
(1997) ,2 Jensen (2000), Dahl and Moretti (2004), Qian (2005), etc.
In the following exercise, I test for both theories of gender bias ("Symmetry Theory" and
"Son Preference"). To do so, I document whether parents were more likely to have another
child, conditional on the gender composition of their existing children. Israel is a particularly
interesting place study gender bias, as it includes both patriarchal and matriarchal religions.
The majority of families in our sample (87%) are of Jewish faith, which is passed down gener-
ations via the mother. On the other hand, in Arab societies, where individuals tend to be of
2Their findings provide very weak support for the gender bias hypothesis in Tunisia. They find no evidence
of bias in breast-feeding practices across male and female children in Morocco.
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Christian or Muslim faith, religion is passed through the father. Therefore, we might expect
Jewish families to have a preference for girls (or at least, a preference for a symmetric family)
relative to Arabs.
Using data from the 1983 Israeli Census, I constructed three primary samples: 53,529
married women who gave birth to one or more children, 40,224 married women who gave
birth to two or more children, and 19,379 married women who gave birth to three or more
children. To isolate women of childbearing age, I only include women aged 21-40 in each sample.
Moreover, since I am primarily interested in the tradeoff a woman faces between raising a child
and working, and since older children require a lesser time commitment from their parents, I
exclude women with children aged 19 and older.3
I imposed three further restrictions on the sample. First, the Census data is a snapshot
of a particular point in time, and thus lacks data on completed family size. Consequently, I
may assume that a woman decided not to have an additional child, when in reality, the woman
decided to have the child after the survey was undertaken. To mitigate this problem, I exclude
women whose last child was born more than three years ago, the average number of years
between births in the sample. 4
Second, married women confront different choices regarding work and family. If a married
woman can rely on her husband to provide a source of income for the household, her choices
regarding work may be less constrained than otherwise similar single women (Schultz 1990).
Thus, I excluded single women. As a robustness measure, I simultaneously conducted the
estimation for samples that included single females, but as single women only comprise about
2.5% of the sample, the results are not highly sensitive to this exclusion.
Finally, the Census only includes gender and age data for children currently living in the
household. It does not indicate whether a child living in the household is a biological child,
nor does it provide information on biological children who died or who are not living with
the mother. As such, I only included households where I could ascertain the gender and
3This rule excluded few women because the average age of first birth is approximately 22 and the oldest
woman in our sample is 40.
4Angrist and Evans (1998) drop women from their sample who had a child in the year before the survey (to
allow for the 9 months of pregnancy). The contraceptive effects of breastfeeding and preference for child spacing
caused us to use a cutoff of 3 years. Estimation was conducted using Angrist and Evans cutoff; the results were
not sensitive to the cutoff.
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age information for all biological children, i.e. I exclude women for whom the number of
children living in the household did not match the "number of children ever given birth to."
This restriction is quite important: Suppose the children live with other relatives because the
mother prefers to enter the formal labor market. If I did not impose this restriction, I would
underestimate the labor supply response to childbirth. Moreover, if gender bias against girls
prevails, girls may have greater child mortality or a greater chance of being sent to live with
other relatives, introducing selectivity bias.
Panel A of Table 3.1 looks at the decision to have a second child, conditional on already
having one child (Columns 1 and 2). As expected, the gender of the first child is random:
49% of first children are female. Conditional on having one daughter, 93.6% of women have a
2nd child, while 92.9% have a 2nd child conditional on having one son. This small difference
(-0.006) is insignificant. While it is possible that our sample size is not large enough to detect
such a small difference, it is much more likely that this result is due to the "Large Family
Hypothesis." Ben Porath and Welch (1976) hypothesize that the gender of the 1st child does
not determine overall family size when couples expect to have large families, because the laws
of probability grant them a high likelihood of having a child of the desired gender. Israelis tend
to have relatively large families, and thus may simply not care about the gender of their first
child.
To better test the Large Family Hypothesis, I separate individuals in the sample by Arabic
and Jewish heritage (Columns 3-6), with the prior belief that Jews are inclined to have smaller
overall families. In comparison to Arab families, I find that Israeli Jews indeed have smaller
families conditional on having one child, and that the gender of the first child is a better predictor
of having a second child for Jewish families (in particular, Jewish families with one son are .7
percentage points less likely to have had a second child, and this difference is significant). The
fact that gender bias is detected at a lower parity for Jewish families (who, on average, have a
smaller completed family size) lends suggestive support for the Large Family Hypothesis.
Next, I determine whether the gender of the first two children determines the decision to
have a third child. Panel B of Table 1 presents these results. 69.7% of families have a third
child conditional on having two children of the same sex, whereas only 66% have a third child
conditional having two children of different genders; this different is significant, lending support
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for the "Symmetry Theory." However, having two children of the same gender is a significant
predictor of having a 3rd child for Jewish families only; for Arab families, the difference of .007
is insignificant. The Large Family Hypothesis can, once again, be a possible explanation for
this result: Conditional on having 2 children, approximately 90% of Arab families have at least
a 3rd child, compared to 60% of Jewish families. However, this does not appear to be the only
reason, as I detect a bias against daughters at this level of parity: Arab women are much more
likely to have a 3rd child conditional on having two daughters (95.5) as opposed to having two
sons (91.9).
Panel C of Table 3.1 presents the probability that a family had a 4th child conditional on
having three children. I find strong evidence for the "Son Preference" theory: families tend to
be 7.8% more likely to have had at least a 4th child, conditional on having three daughters.
The probability that an Arab will have a 4th child conditional on having three children is high
(around 90%), and it appears that gender matters: Arabs are 6.2% more likely to have had a
4th child conditional on having 3 daughters. This pattern of fertility for Arabs lends support
for the Large Family Hypothesis; gender preferences are more apparent for Arabs as family size
grows.
The patterns of childbirth imply that having at least one son is also important for Jewish
families-they are 8.4% more likely to have a fourth child, conditional on having three daughters.
It is, however, difficult to conclude why: families may keep trying for a son either for symmetry
or for son preference. Nor, does this finding negate the theory that Jewish families may value
girls more than families of patriarchal religions because the Jewish religion is spread through
the mothers. First, couples may prefer having at least one son if the number of male children
is a source of pride for the family, as is the case in many traditional cultures. Second, the
relationship between sex composition and family size may not be a function of preferences; it
may be a result of the different prices of daughters and sons (Ben-Porath and Welch, 1976).
For example, if sons are more capable of financially supporting elderly parents, having a son
is-on net-relatively cheaper than having a daughter.
Within the Jewish and Arab cultures, there are many subcultures. For example, within the
Arab community, Muslims and Christians have different traditions and beliefs about family and
work. Likewise, there are strong cultural differences between Jews of American and European
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Background (AE Jews) versus Asian and African Background (AA Jews). In Table 3.2, I
disaggregate the data by subculture.5 As illustrated in Panel A, neither Muslim nor Christian
Arabs display gender preference in the decision to have a second child (Columns 1-4), while Jews
of both backgrounds display a preference for sons (Columns 5-8). The gender of the existing
children does not significantly determine the probability that either Arab subgroup have a third
child (Panel B). In contrast, having two daughters is a significant predictor of whether or not
Jewish families (of any origin) will have an additional child.
The most striking results can be found in Panel C of Table 3.2. Christian women were
14.2% more likely to have had a fourth child, conditional on having 3 girls, while AA Jews were
10.7% more likely. Several stories may possibly explain these sizable outcomes. For example,
let us assume that women prefer smaller families (this assumption is not entirely implausible,
as childbirth can negatively impact one's health and having additional children strains one's
time and financial resources). Then, these figures imply that having at least one son is desirable
enough to counteract the costs of having a large family.
Thus far, I have examined gender bias across cultural groups. However, gender preferences
may be associated with other socioeconomic characteristics. For example, Edlund (1999) models
the demand for daughters and sons. In her model, a scarcity of women implies that a woman
from the lower class will marry upwards, providing an avenue of social mobility for the family.
This leads to an equilibrium in which poorer families prefer daughters while richer families
prefer sons. Rather than look at income, I have chosen to look at gender bias across individuals
of different education levels since education can plausibly been seen as exogenous: It is safe to
assume that a woman makes her decisions on education before she discovers the gender of her
first few children.
Table 3.3 presents the extent of gender bias, by education level, for both Arabs and Jews. 6
Educated women may have access to higher paying jobs or have a preference for working outside
the home, both of which increase the opportunity cost of additional children. Thus, as expected,
educated women bear fewer children: on average, college educated women have 1.98 kids, while
those with a high school degree have 2.11 and those with a primary school degree have 3.28.
5Druze women were excluded due to a small sample size.
6As there did not appear to be large differences in the behavior of the subgroups in Table 2, for this exercise,
I simply disaggregate the data by Arab and Jewish heritage.
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The level of gender bias across women of different educational backgrounds is startling:
Arab women with a college degree are 40.7% and Jewish women with a graduate degree are
15.1% more likely to have had a 4th child, conditional on having three daughters. In contrast,
Arab and Jewish women with a primary school degree are, respectively, 5% and 9% more likely
to have a 4th child conditional on having three daughters. This, perhaps, implies that despite
the high opportunity costs for raising an additional child, educated women are willing to bear
these costs in order to attempt to have at least one son.7
These simple exercises provide a deeper understanding of gender bias. For the remainder
of this paper, I exploit these biases to find exogenous changes in childbirth, which can be used
to estimate the causal relationship between childbirth and labor force participation. Since, as
the exercise has shown, gender preferences do not determine decision to have a second child, I
concentrate on the labor supply response to childbirth for women who have had two or more
children (2+ sample) and women who have had three or more children (3+ sample).
Table 3.4 presents fertility and labor market statistics for both of these samples; Columns
1-5 present sample statistics for the 2+ sample. The gender of each child is distributed as a
Bernoulli random variable with probability equal : 50.6% of the 1st child born and 50.9% of
the 2nd child born were male. It, therefore, follows that approximately half the woman gave
birth to two children of the same gender (Panel A). In the full sample, the age of first birth is
22.4 years and women have, on average, three children.
These simple means hide interesting heterogeneity across the three cultural groups. Muslim
women have their 1st child at a younger age (20.7) and have larger families (5 kids) than the
women in the Jewish (2.9 kids) and Christian samples (3.6 kids). A larger fraction of Muslim
women (96%) gave birth to a 3rd child, as compared to Jewish (64%) and Christian (83%)
women. These statistics are consistent with the Islam's emphasis on early marriage and large
families.
Panel B presents basic means for labor market outcomes. It illustrates the stark disparity in
male and female labor participation rates: 46% of the married women worked for pay, as opposed
7The difference in visibility of gender bias across educational groups may also be attributed to differences in
the level of birth control availability. If educated women have greater access to birth control, it may be relatively
easier for them to their gender preferences than less educated women (who may have the same gender preferences,
but not the means to practice them).
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to 86% of their husbands. These participation rates fail to fully describe the gender gaps in
the labor market. While many women exit the labor force temporarily or altogether in order
to fulfill household demands (Genevie and Margilies, 1987), others undertake less demanding
or part time jobs (Gangagharan and Rosenbloom, 1996). Furthermore, many women move
into occupations that trade wages for non-pecuniary benefits, such as employment flexibility.
Thus, to have a more complete picture of the effect of childbirth on work patterns, I examine
other labor market outcomes as well, such as weeks worked, hours worked per week, and gross
personal, s and family income.9
Women across the cultural groups exhibit different work patterns. Jewish women are more
likely to be employed for pay; approximately 51% of Jewish women are employed for pay, as
compared to 6% of Muslim and 23% of Christian women.10 On average, Arabs possess fewer
monetary resources; Jews have an income of 47,877 Shekels while Muslims have an average
income of 19,482. A variety of factors, such as a lower rate of female labor participation,
discrimination, and regional differences, may attribute to these vast differences in family income.
Table 3.4, Columns 6 through 9 present similar statistics for the 3+ sample. This 3+ sample
reinforces the trends in the 2+ sample: Muslim women tend to have their first child at an earlier
age than Jewish women (20.6 versus 22.1), work less (4% are employed as compared to 45%)
and have lower family incomes (19,456 versus 42,710). However, the 3+ sample differs in levels.
Women in the 3+ sample tend to have larger overall families (an artifact of the sample design).
While their age of first birth tends to be the same as the 2+ sample, they currently are older
(33.9 versus 32.7). The women in the 3+ sample are also less likely to be employed for pay.
Quite interestingly, Jews in the 3+ sample have significantly lower family income (42,710
Shekels) than Jews in the 2+ sample (47,877 Shekels). This is not the case for Christian or
Muslim families. Once again, this may be an artifact of sample design as there are relatively
8 Unfortunately, for weeks worked, hours worked and gross personal income, the Census only includes data for
salaried workers. I assigned a value of zero to unemployed workers, but observations for self-employed workers
were eliminated from the samples.
9Another interesting feature of our data was the discrepancy between the family's income as reported by the
wife and as reported by the husband; husbands were more likely to report higher average incomes than their
wives. For our analysis, I used family income as reported by the wife.
10This difference does not appear to be a function of our sample restrictions. In the full sample of all married
women within the 21-40-age category, the differences remain; 53% of Jewish women work compared with 5% of
Arab women.
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few Arab families with less than 2 children). This finding may perhaps also be attributed to the
fact that Jewish women in the 2+ sample have higher rates of employment (52%) than women
in the 3+ sample (45%).
3.3 Regression Analysis (2+ sample)
Simple OLS regressions of the number of children on employment status cannot provide causal
evidence on the link between childbirth and work. Women with preferences for work may
reduce household responsibilities by having smaller families. The random assignment of gender
allows us to bypass this reverse causation problem. Specifically, I take advantage of both the
"Symmetry Theory" and "Son Preference Theory" to exploit exogenous variation in the demand
for a third child (2+ sample).
Exploiting the "Symmetry Theory," I assume that families with 2 children of the same gender
are more likely to have a 3rd child, regardless of other characteristics (including preferences for
work). I, then, compare the labor market response to having a 3rd child for women who have
two children of the same sex to women who have one daughter and one son. In a regression
framework, I estimate a two stage least squares model with an indicator variable for "two
children of the same sex" as the instrument for having a 3rd child.
Let Y be a vector of the labor market outcome, which may be an indicator for employment
status, weeks worked, hours worked, personal income or family income. Let C indicate that the
family had more than 2 children, Si indicate that the ith child is male, and X be a matrix of
exogenous covariates. The fertility equation (the first stage) models the effect of having children
of the same sex {ZI: S1 S2 +(1- S1)(1- S2)} on the decision to have more than 2 children:
Cj = Zljil + SljP2 + S2j/3 + Xj3 4 + ej (1)
The labor supply equation, then, models the effect of having at least three children on the
labor market:
Yj = Cjl1 + Slj6 2 + S2j63 + Xj6 4 + Uj (2)
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In addition to the variables included in X, I include the additive effects for the gender of the
children (S1 and S2). These effects cannot be ignored if a child's gender influences labor supply
for reasons other than changes in family size. For example, the sex of offspring may affect the
father's commitment to the family, may change the quality investments into the child made by
the mother, may change the time requirement needed by the mother since boys are more prone
to be born with disabilities, etc.
Next, I exploit the "Son Preference" Model, which states that parents with two daughters
are more likely to have another child than parents with at least one son. I model an alternative
fertility equation as:
Cj = Z2j + Z3i 2 + Slji3 + Xj3 4 + ej (3)
where Z2: S1S2, i.e. having sons, and Z1: (1- Sl)(1- S2 ). In this equation, I cannot include
both Sland S2 since these variables are collinear with Z2; without loss of generality, I exclude
S2 .
Table 3.5 presents the OLS estimation for both fertility equations (Equations 1 and 3).
Columns 1-8 include age and the age of first birth as covariates. Since the Census lacks data
on completed family size, there exists a mechanical correlation between age and the completed
family size. To correct for this problem, I always include age as a covariate. The OLS estimates
of the fertility equations confirm the patterns observed in the exercise in Section II. For the
full sample, having two children of the same sex significantly increases the likelihood of having
more than two children (.037 in column 1), and having two daughters significantly increases
the likelihood of having additional children (.046 in column 2). Having two sons increases the
probability that the parents have additional children, but this effect is neither as large nor as
significant as the effect of having daughters. Columns 3 through 8 disaggregate the data by
religious group. The same sex indicator is a significant predictor of childbirth only for Jews.
Since the same sex indicator does not predict fertility patterns for Arabs, I do not use this
variable to estimate the labor supply response for these groups. "Having two girls" is a better
predictor of fertility: it is significant at the 5% level for Jews and Christians and is significant
at the 10% level for Muslims.
In Columns 9 through 16, I included several additional controls variables: years of education,
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a set of indicator variables for region, and an indicator variable for Jewish versus Arab. It is
unsurprising that the models including all covariates is similar to the results including just age
and age at first birth. Gender is randomly assigned, and therefore should not be correlated
with demographic characteristics.11
Table 3.6 presents the estimation of the labor supply equation (Equation 2). Each
cell in the table comes from a separate regression of "having a third child" on each dependent
variable. For the wives, Column 1 presents the mean of the dependent variable, Column 2
presents the simple OLS estimation of the labor supply equation, Column 3 presents the TSLS
estimation of the model where "having two girls" or "having two boys" are the instruments for
the decision to have a third child, and Column 4 presents the TSLS estimation using the Same-
sex dummy as an instrument. Columns 5 through 8 replicate the analysis for the husbands.
Columns 9 through 11 present the estimation results by religious groups.
Consistent with the earlier literature, the OLS estimation (Column 2) exhibits large, signif-
icant labor market effects for women: having a 3rd child implies a lower probability of working
for pay, less weeks worked, less hours worked, and less gross (and family) income. The 2SLS
estimation-with two boys and two girls as instruments-is similar to the OLS results in mag-
nitude (Column 3). Women with more than 2 children work outside the home significantly
less (-.254), reduce hours (-9.6) reduce weeks worked (-9.6), and have a lower personal income
(-16,062). Despite the fact that women work less, total family income remains unchanged. The
2SLS strategy using the Same-sex indicator as the instrument (Column 4) gives coefficients of
a similar magnitude, but the results are no longer accurately predicted. 12
The estimates suggest that a woman's personal income may fall as her family size
increases; however, her family's total income is unaffected. This may imply, as Gronau (1977)
suggests, that men work more with each additional child to compensate for their wives' exit for
the labor market. To check this theory, I estimate the labor supply equation for husbands. The
11 To test verify the randomness of the instrument, I ran a regression of the same sex dummy on each covariate.
There did not appear to be any significant relationships.
12Theoretically, as our instruments are uncorrelated with demographic characteristics, there is no need to
include the demographic characteristics in the estimation. Thus, while these results are available from the
author upon request, they are suppressed here for brevity. The family size coefficient estimates from a model
including covariates are similar in magnitude to the results presented here, but are less accurate measured, with
the exception of the effect of family size on Gross Income; it is slightly smaller than the estimation without
covariates, but still significant.
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2SLS results on the husband's labor supply participation are small and cannot be significantly
rejected from zero.
Columns 9 through 11 present our estimation of the labor supply equations for women,
by religion. I only present the estimation with "having two girls" and "having two boys"
as instruments. For Jews, a third child results in a reduction in employment (-.216) that is
significant at the 10% level and the reduction in personal gross income (-16,527) is significant at
the 5% level. I find large, negative effects for Christians and Muslims. However, the standard
errors are large, and I cannot reject that the parameters are, in fact, zero. Several factors can
attribute to the results for Christian and Muslim women. First, there may simply be no labor
market effect for women from these cultural groups. Second, the samples for the Christian and
Muslim groups are quite small, and, thus, may not be large enough to reasonably conduct two
stage least squares model. Finally, the analysis of gender bias in the previous section confirmed
that while the gender of the first two children if a good predictor of the decision to have a third
child for Jewish families, the gender of the 1st two children is a moderate predictor of family
size for Arab families. As such, the gender instruments may simply be poor instruments for
family size for Arabs.
3.4 Regression Analysis (3+ sample)
The estimation using the 2+ sample furthered our knowledge on the labor supply response to
childbirth for Jewish families, but failed to provide insight as to whether there was a response
for Muslims and Christians. The fact that our instrument (gender bias) may have been poor
for Muslim and Christian families is one possible reason for this lack of insight. Christian and
Muslim Arabs tend to have large families, and, therefore, the gender of their first two children
does not appear to influence their decision to have a third child.
In this section, I try a slightly different approach. The Large Family Hypothesis predicts
that as family size approaches expected family size, gender matters more (our analysis in Section
II reinforced this hypothesis). Therefore, I use gender preferences to determine how the decision
to have a 4th child affects a woman's labor market outcomes.13
13For completeness, the analysis was also attempted with the 5th child as well, but this significantly reduces
the sample size.
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Let Y be the labor market outcome, Si indicate that the ith child is male, and X be a matrix
of exogenous covariates. Let Q be an indicator variable showing that the family has had 4 or
more children. Define having three daughters as ZG: (1- S1)(1- S2 ) (1- S3) and having 3 sons as
ZB: S1S2S3. The fertility equation, which looks at whether having three children of the same
gender predicts the probability of having a 4th child, is:
Qj = ZGj 1+ ZBj32 + Slj3 + S2j]34 + Xj/ 5 + ej (4)
The labor supply equation is:
Yj = Qjb1 + Slj62 + S2j64 + Xj65 + uj (5)
Table 3.7 presents the OLS estimation for the fertility equation (Equation 4) for the full
sample (Col 1) and the different cultural groups (Col 3, 5, 7). For brevity, only the results from
the equations with age and age at first birth as control variables are presented. As my analysis
in Section II suggested, the results here confirm that couples are biased against daughters. For
the full sample, having three girls is a significant predictor of having a fourth child (.065 more
likely to have had another child conditional on having three girls), while having three boys
does not increase the probability of bearing another child. For Muslims and Jews, the "three
girl" indicator is positive and significant at the 5% level. Once again, the 3 boy indicator is
indistinguishable from zero (Columns 3 & 7). For Christians (Column 5), both gender variables
are insignificant determinants of fertility choices.
The analysis in Section II also revealed that education affects the level of gender bias.
Educated women are prone to reduce the number of children they bear, except when they lack
a son. Thus, I can alternatively model the decision to have more than three children as the
result of the interaction between a woman's education and the gender of her children.
I assume that education is exogenous: a woman completes her education before ascertaining
the gender of her first few children. Let D be a matrix of dummy variables indicating the highest
degree completed: graduate, college, high school or primary school. The new fertility equation
is:
114
Qj = Dj * ZGj1 + Dj/3 + ZBj3 + Slj/4 + S2j5 + Xj36 ej (6)
Table 3.7, Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 present the OLS estimation of Equation 6 for the full
sample, Muslims, Christians and Jews, respectively.l4 The three girl indicator interacted with
the educational attainment is positive and significant. Having both a graduate degree and
three daughters increases the probability that a woman has had more than three children by 20
percentage points (Column 2) while having three daughters and a lesser degree only increases
the likelihood by 5-7 percentage points.
Interestingly, I observe these patterns in all religious groups. 15 For Muslims, having a
college degree and 3 daughters increases the probability that a woman has had more than three
children by 43 percentage points, while having a primary school degree and three daughters
increases the probability by 1.7 points. Both Jewish and Christian women with a graduate
degree and three daughters are 20 percentage points more likely to have more than three
children.
The estimation of the labor supply equations (Equation 5) for the full 3+ sample is
presented in Table 3.8. As before, each cell represents the labor supply response to childbirth
estimated from a separate regression. Columns 1 through 4 present the results for the full
sample, Columns 5 and 6 present the results for Christians, Columns 7 and 8 present the
results for Muslims, and, finally, Columns 9 and 10 present the results for Jews. Once again,
in all regressions, age and age of first birth are included as covariates.
The estimates of the labor supply response from the simple OLS estimations are large,
negative and significant, but cannot be given a causal interpretation (Column 2). Column 3
presents the two stage least squares analysis when "having three daughters" is the instrument
for "having a fourth child," while Column 4 presents the analysis where the instrument is
the interaction of "having three daughters" and the woman's education level.16 The 2SLS
14For the educational attainment dummies, I used a variable indicating the highest degree completed. When
data on the highest degree was missing, I estimated the degree using the years of education completed. Christian
and Muslim women do not have graduate degrees in this sample.
151 also estimated the labor supply effects using the full set of covariates. Results were similar, and I omit
them here for brevity.
16Fixed effects for educational attainment are included in the regressions where gender is interacted with
education.
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estimation establishes that having more than three children reduces the probability of working
for pay, hours worked, weeks worked and gross personal income; however, these parameters are
not significant at conventional levels.
For Christians, having an additional child does not affect a woman's labor supply response.
This is unsurprising because the instruments, "having three girls" and "having three boys," do
not significantly determine fertility behavior for Christians (and, are thus poor instruments).
On the other hand, I find that Jewish women work significantly less when they have more than
four children; using the "having three girls" and "having three boys" indicators as instruments,
I estimate a reduction of -.32 that is significant at the 10% level (Column 9). Using gender
interacted with education (Column 10), I estimate a reduction of -.44 in the probability of
working for pay (significant at 5%) and a reduction of -14.4 weeks worked per year (significant
at 10%). The effects on income and hours worked for Jewish women cannot be distinguished
from zero.
The labor supply effects for Muslim women (Columns 3 - 4) are surprising. As is
the case for women of Jewish and Christian religions, the labor supply effects using OLS are
negative (not presented here, for brevity). However, the labor supply effects for Muslim women,
controlling for the endogeneuity problem, are positive; using gender interacted with education
(Column 8), the effects are positive and significant. Muslim women who have more than 3
children work for pay much more often, work more hours and possess higher incomes than
women who only have 3 children.
Initially, one may believe that these results are counterintuitive: when a woman has more
children, the demand for her time within the household increases, so she works less outside the
home. However, there exist several stories consistent with the results. First, Muslim women
tend to be disproportionably in the lower third of the distribution of husbands income. If
the financial resources of the family are scarce and another child further drains these resources,
women who have more children may need employment outside the home in order to supplement
the income of the father.
Second, I estimate the effect of having a fourth child; if a woman already has three children,
there may be a child who is old enough to assist with household chores and baby-sit younger
siblings while their mother works. Since she has help in the household, the woman's time inside
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the household may be relatively less valuable than a woman who has fewer or no children.
Thus, the financial burden of an additional child may be greater than the opportunity cost of
the mother's time within the household. This implies that there may be a u-shaped relationship
between the numbers of offspring and the probability of employment.
3.5 Labor Supply Response and Husband's Income
In the previous sections, I uncovered interesting differences in the labor supply response to
childbirth for women from different religious backgrounds. However, it is not altogether clear
that religion is driving the results, as these cultural groups also differ along many socioeconomic
dimensions (average educational attainment, average income, etc). For example, having a
husband with a steady income may persuade pregnant woman to exit the workforce. In contrast,
if her income is necessary for the family's survival, the woman may choose to continue working
outside the home.
In the 3+ sample, I find that having four or more children caused Muslim women to enter
the labor force, while simultaneously causing Jewish women to work less. In this section, I
determine whether socioeconomic characteristics (other than religion) may be driving these re-
sults. Specifically, I test whether the husband's income affects a woman's labor supply response:
Muslim women are disproportionately represented in the lower portion of the distribution of
husband's income, while Jewish women are disproportionately represented in the upper portion.
Does family income matter more than culture or religion?
I disaggregate the data for Jewish women by their husband's income category: lower third,
middle third, and upper third (unfortunately, the sample of Muslim women is too small to
disaggregate by income and, therefore, I do not conduct the analysis for this group). I then
estimate the labor supply response to having a third child for women in each of these income
categories. Table 3.9 presents this analysis for the 2+ sample.
Simple OLS estimates show a negative correlation between having a third child and working
for pay for women across all income categories. However, in the 2SLS analysis, only the women
in the middle-income bracket work less when they have another child. I find a negative labor
supply response for the poorest women, but the effect is not significant at conventional levels.
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The women in the richest third income category do not change their work behaviors in response
to childbirth.
The analysis in this section should be interpreted with caution. While it suggests that
women of different income categories respond differently to childbirth, it is not necessarily
clear that income fully drives these results. Other (often unobserved) socioeconomic factors-
that may be correlated with income-may account for these differences in the labor supply
response across the income groups. However, the analysis does suggest that religious institutions
may not be fully responsible for differences in behavior across the women of different religious
backgrounds; instead, differences in average income (and, other socioeconomic characteristics)
may attribute to the observed differences in the labor supply response.
3.6 Conclusion
Understanding fertility patterns and the labor supply response to childbirth is essential when
evaluating social trends, as well as public policy choices. In this paper, I explored the fertility
patterns of Israeli women using the 1983 Israeli Census, and then used exogenous variation in
fertility to estimate the labor supply response to childbirth.
I find differences in gender bias (and thus in fertility patterns) across different cultural
groups. Israeli Arabs unambiguously prefer sons. In contrast, Israeli Jews exhibit both a
preference for sons and a taste for symmetric families (at least one son, and one daughter).
Very educated Arabs and Jews appear to prefer small families, but both groups are significantly
more likely to have another child if they only have daughters.
Taking advantage of this exogenous variation in fertility, I find that Jewish women work
less as a result of having a third child. Muslim and Christian Arabs also work less as result
of having a third child; however, this decrease is not significant at conventional levels. When
extending the analysis to look at the labor supply response to a fourth child, I find that Jewish
women are less likely to work with an additional child but Muslim women are more likely
to be employed. The analysis suggests that religious institutions may not only factor driving
differences in behavior across religious groups. Instead, it is possible that differences in average
income (and, perhaps, other socioeconomic characteristics that are correlated with income) may
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contribute to these observed differences.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics
2+ Experiment 3+ Experiment
Full Sample Arabs Arabs
Wives Husbands Muslims Christians Jews Wives Muslims Christians Jews
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Fertility
Number of children
More than 2 children
3.2
(1.3)
0.07
(0.47)
5.0
(1.9)
-- 0.96
(0.21)
3.6
(1.2)
0.83
(0.38)
2.9
(0.1)
0.64
(0.48)
More than 3 children
First Child Male
Second Child Male
0.51
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
-- 0.51
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
Third Child Male
4.0 5.6 4.2
(1.4) (1.8) (1.1)
0.53
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
0.92
(0.28)
0.51
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
0.71
(0.46)
0.49
(0.50)
0.49
(0.50)
0.52
(0.50)
Two daughters
1st two children of
the same gender
Three Daughers
Age
Age at first birth
0.25
(0.43)
0.50
(0.50)
32.7
(4.0)
22.4
(3.0)
-- 0.24
(0.43)
-- 0.51
(0.50)
36.6
(5.2)
26.2
(4.1)
30.6
(4.5)
20.7
(3.1)
Market Outcomes
Worked for pay
Weeks Worked
Hours Worked
Gross Income
Family Gross Income
0.46
(0.50)
23
(25)
16
(18)
9327
(18392)
43753
(45019)
0
(0
(
35
(37
.86 0.06 0.23 0.52 0.36
.34) (0.02) (0.42) (0.50) (0.48)
45 3 10 26 19
16) (11) (20) (25) (24)
43 2 7 18 13
19) (8) (14) (18) (17)
5645 955 3984 10659 6599
'7120) (4558) (9607) (19420) (15509)
-- 19482 24227 47877 37558
-- (18014) (24182) (47033) (38186)
N 40224_ 4022 3925 77 3480 19380 3047 51 1530
3.6
(0.9)
0.44
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.51
(0.50)
0.24
(0.43)
0.50
(0.50)
0.26
(0.44)
0.52
(0.50)
32.6
(4.3)
22.2
(3.2)
0.13
(0.33)
33.9
(3.7)
21.8
(2.8)
33.0
(3.8)
22.6
(2.9)
0.12
(0.32)
31.6
(4.2)
20.6
(3.1)
0.13
(0.34)
33.7
(3.8)
21.8
(3.0)
0.13
(0.33)
34.4
(3.4)
22.1
(2.6)
B Labor
0.04
(0.21)
2
(10)
1
(7)
680
(3913)
19456
(18259)
0.18
(0.38)
8
(18)
5
(12)
3224
(9510)
23199
(23789)
0.45
(0.50)
23
(25)
15
(18)
8192
(17033)
42710
(40919)
3925 877 34802 - 938-0 3047 -- 581 15307N 40224 40224
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Table 3.9: Estimation of the Labor Supply Equation for
Wives by Location on the Distribution of Husband's Income
(2+ Jewish Sample)
OLS 2SLS
Income Category: (1) (2)
Lower Third -0.23 -0.25
(0.01) (0.25)
Middle Third -0.25 -0.64
(0.01) (0.42)
Upper Third -0.18 -0.01
(0.01) (0.23)
Notes: For our 2SLS methdology, we use bothgirl and bothboy
as instruments.
